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Abstract 
Over the past few decades, animal and public health professionals have become 
increasingly concerned about the global animal population’s vulnerability to Transboundary 
Animal Diseases (TADs).  Through analysis of the lessons learned by the United Kingdom (UK), 
Taiwan, and Egypt in responding to FMD outbreaks in their countries, it becomes apparent that 
even with response plans in place at the time of an outbreak, problems still arose as the outbreaks 
progressed.  To better understand why these deviations from the planned course occur, the 
concept of “disconnects” in the various “domains” of TAD emergency preparedness and 
response were explored for the United States (U.S.).  Particular emphasis was placed on issues 
related to the collaboration and cooperation between the federal and state levels of government.  
The domains of communication, knowledge, and resourcing were selected to be analyzed due to 
their importance in TAD emergency outbreak preparedness and response. 
The research questions this thesis explores concern three domains of TAD emergency 
preparedness and response that experience disconnects between federal and state levels of 
government.  They also explore how these disconnects affect Food and Agriculture Security in 
the U.S.  Three different methods were used to research these topics.  Literature reviews of 
lessons learned and after action reports from TAD outbreak exercises and real events were 
conducted.  Direct observations of the author’s experiences at conferences, seminars, and 
training events were also included.  Finally, personal interviews were conducted with Food and 
Agriculture Security experts. 
Through this analysis, numerous disconnects emerged in each of the domains.  Several 
disconnects traverse all three domains.  These disconnects related to laboratory collaboration 
with the federal government, the process of declaring a federal emergency, and the roles and 
responsibilities of individuals and groups involved in TAD outbreak preparedness and response.  
Overall, the disconnects affect the ability of state and federal governments to rapidly respond to 
and coordinate response efforts.  This affects Food and Agriculture Security by compromising 
the safety, security, and ongoing operation of the food and agriculture sector.  Further study will 
be needed to alleviate these disconnects so that better cooperation and collaboration can occur 
between federal and state levels of government.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Over the past few decades, animal and public health professionals have become 
increasingly concerned about the global animal population’s vulnerability to Transboundary 
Animal Diseases (TADs).  According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), TADs 
are “those that are of significant economic, trade, and/or food security importance, which can 
easily spread to other countries and reach epidemic proportions, and where control/management, 
including exclusion, requires cooperation between several countries.” 1  These diseases can affect 
the public health, economy, and food supply of afflicted countries.  In order to prevent future 
outbreaks or minimize the effects of TAD events, emergency preparedness programs become 
necessary.  Global organizations such as the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) are 
dedicated to the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information regarding TAD 
outbreaks.2  The OIE also provides guidelines to help nations prevent and control TADs.  
Regulations and practices based on these guidelines are now integrated into the world trade 
market.  This has the effect of making preparedness and response to TADs a highly economically 
driven process.3
                                                 
1 This term, first developed by the Food and Agriculture Organization, is increasing in use world-wide to overcome 
problems with older terminology like “foreign animal disease.”  Committee on Foreign and Emerging Diseases of 
the United States Animal Health Association, "Foreign Animal Diseases," (St. Joseph, Missouri: United States 
Animal Health Association, 2008). Pg. 18.  Some may prefer the term “foreign animal disease” (or FAD), but the 
term is generally used by only U.S. officials.  “FADs” are ones which originate in another country and can, or do, 
enter the U.S. Gary C. Smith, "What Are We Doing to Prevent Entry of Potentially Catastrophic Foreign Animal 
Disease into the USA," in Range Beef Cow Symposium (Casper, Wyoming: University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 2001).  
The term FAD has become less meaningful due to the rapid movement of disease across the globe and the increased 
chances of finding them in the U.S.  At the same time, it is still arguably meaningful, as more of these diseases are 
entering new regions than they ever have in the past.  Committee on Foreign and Emerging Diseases of the United 
States Animal Health Association, "Foreign Animal Diseases." Pg. 17. 
  National institutions, such as the Department of Homeland Security in the 
United States (U.S.), seek to protect and defend their nation’s agriculture and food supply.  In the 
2 World Organization for Animal Health, "The OIE,"  http://www.oie.int/eng/OIE/en_objectifs.htm#6.  Accessed 
April 2010. 
3 Royal Society, "Infectious Diseases in Livestock Full Report," (July 2002). Pg. 2. 
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U.S., numerous federal departments are involved; they work together to develop a “coordinated 
agricultural and food-specific standardized response plan.” 4   This plan should appropriate the 
roles of the federal, state, state, and private sector participants.5
There have been several TAD outbreaks of significance over the past few decades.  One 
of the more highly publicized events is the foot and mouth disease (FMD) outbreak in the United 
Kingdom (UK) in 2001.
  
6
United Kingdom Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak 
  Another noteworthy FMD outbreak occurred in Taiwan in 1997.  
Other countries, such as Egypt, have had several FMD outbreaks throughout the last 50 years.  
These three countries’ experiences with TADs are worthy of review, as they represent three 
different levels of capability in TAD preparedness and response. 
The emergency preparedness and response plans in the UK, based on a framework 
established by the European Union (EU), operated according to domestic FMD outbreak-control 
legislation passed in 1981 and 1983.7  The required responses involved introduction of 
biosecurity measures, such as movement restrictions, and institution of a “stamp out” policy.8
                                                 
4 George W. Bush, "Homeland Security Presidential Directive-9," ed. Homeland Security, Homeland Security 
Presidential Directives (Washington D.C.2004). Pg. 3 paragraph (15). 
  
5 Ibid. 
6 FMD is a highly contagious and debilitating viral disease of cattle and swine.  Animals also affected include sheep, 
goats, deer, and other cloven-hooved ruminants.  Infected animals can have the symptoms of fever and blister-like 
lesions inside the mouth, on the tongue and lips, between the hooves, and on the teats.  The blisters are usually 
followed by erosions.  Infected animals often recover from the virus, but the virus causes the animal to lose 
productivity.  USDA-APHIS Veterinary Services, "Foot-and-Mouth Disease Factsheet," (2007). 
7 EU policy for FMD is established in Directive 85/511/EEC amended by Directive 90/423/EEC.  UK domestic 
legislation is established in the Animal Health Act of 1981 and the Foot and Mouth Disease Order of 1983.  
Cumbria Foot and Mouth Disease Inquiry Panel, "Cumbria Foot and Mouth Disease Inquiry Report," (Cumbria, 
UK2002). Pg. 25-26. 
8 Ibid. Pgs. 25-26,33.  A stamping-out policy is used to rapidly eliminate a TAD or other emergency animal disease 
outbreak.   A stamping-out policy requires several components.  First, the infected zones must be designated.  This is 
followed by an intense surveillance effort to identify the infected and contact premises.  Quarantines must then be 
activated and stop-movement orders put in place.  All of the animals that are susceptible to the disease at the 
infected and contact premises, or the entire infected area, are immediately slaughtered.  The carcasses of these 
slaughtered animals must be disposed of, along with all materials that could potentially spread infection.  After 
disposal, the premises are disinfected and cleaned.  Finally, after all these steps have been completed, the premises 
must be maintained in the disinfected and disease free state for a prescribed period of time.  William A Geering, 
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The massive scale of the 2001 outbreak complicated the implementation of these plans, forcing 
disease control officials to re-calibrate their response efforts as they encountered issues that had 
not been addressed in the scope of the existing response plan.9  The 2001 FMD outbreak in the 
UK involved 2030 cases.  Approximately 6 million animals were slaughtered, including pigs, 
cattle, and sheep.  The outbreak had a significant impact on the food and agriculture sectors, 
costing approximately £3.1billion.10  Prior to this outbreak, the UK had been FMD-free since 
1967.11  The 1967 outbreak comprised 2000 reported cases and approximately 500,000 animals.  
The outbreak lasted 9 months.12  Although the 1967 and 2001 outbreaks were similar in duration 
and in relative number of premises infected,13 they were substantially different in a number of 
ways. These differences, including the size of the infected area to the number of species infected, 
affected the scale and logistics of response operations.14
The large number of animals affected and geographic size of the 2001 outbreak created 
numerous concerns.  The wisdom of the decision to cull animals from infected and contiguous 
premises to prevent the spread of the virus was debated in inquiries and lessons learned 
following the UK’s FMD outbreak.  Some inquiries questioned the need to cull animals in 
contiguous premises as well as infected premises; these questions created other questions about 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
Mary-Louise Penrith, and David Nyakahuma, "Manual on Procedures for Disease Eradication by Stamping Out," 
FAO Animal Health Manual (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2001). Forward. 
9 Cumbria Foot and Mouth Disease Inquiry Panel, "Cumbria Foot and Mouth Disease Inquiry Report." Pg. 26. 
10 Department of Environment Food and Rural Affairs, "Animal Health and Welfare: FMD Data Archive,"  
http://footandmouth.csl.gov.uk/. Introduction. Accessed November 2010. 
11 Dr. Maggie Mort et al., "The Health and Social Consequences of 2001 Food & Mouth Disease Epidemic in North 
Cumbria," (Institute for Health Research, 2004). Pg. 9. 
12 LA Reynolds and EM Tansey, eds., Foot and Mouth Disease: The 1967 Outbreak and Its Aftermath, vol. 18, 
Welcome Witnesses to Twentieth Century Medicine (London: Wellcom Trust Centre for the History of Medicine at 
UCL,2003). Pg. 3. 
13 Cumbria Foot and Mouth Disease Inquiry Panel, "Cumbria Foot and Mouth Disease Inquiry Report." Pg. 30. 
14Both the 1967 and 2001 outbreaks had similar numbers of animals involved over a similar period of  time  in their 
early months.  The outbreaks differed in their origin.  The 2001 outbreak is believed to have been spread by an index 
case, whereas the 1967 outbreak was characterized by several farms being infected at the same time from the same 
source.  Food and Rural Affairs Department of Environment, "Origin of the UK Foot and Mouth Disease Epidemic 
in 2001," ed. Food and Rural Affairs Department of Environment (2002). Pg.7.  
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whether or not sufficient resources were available for strict biosecurity enforcement.15  Indeed, 
large numbers of resources were needed to cull and dispose of the animals. Given the scale of the 
epidemic in the UK, disposal of animals from infected and contiguous premises presented a 
considerable challenge.  Initially, disposal lagged behind the slaughter rate.   After British troops 
were deployed, disposal became more efficient and backlogs were cleared.  Initial methods of 
carcass disposal were burial on farms or incineration (in funeral pyres).  On-site burial was 
complicated by environmental concerns, such as soil and water contamination.  Incineration also 
raised environmental and public perception concerns due to the air pollution from funeral pyres 
that were in close vicinity towns and villages.  Later, different disposal methods, such as 
rendering, were utilized.16
Communication was a major issue throughout the outbreak.  Successes in communication 
included those communications occurring within communities.  Radio and television were useful 
media utilized to disseminate information to the public, especially in rural areas.  
Communication problems occurred regarding slaughter and disposal operations. The need for 
rapid response by authorities may have been a contributing factor.  Improvement in 
communication between all entities, along with more consistent information distribution, was 
needed during the outbreak.  Improvements were also needed in the following areas:  policy 
explanation, use of all media sources, field personnel communication, information access 
systems, and written communication policies.
  These methods had improved public perception and allowed for 
faster clearing of backlogged carcasses.  
17
                                                 
15 Dr. Iain Anderson CBE, "Lessons to Be Learned Inquiry Report," (22, July 2002). Pg. 3.  Contiguous premises 
were the premises that shared boundaries, or had contact with the infected premises (neighboring farms). 
 
16 Cumbria Foot and Mouth Disease Inquiry Panel, "Cumbria Foot and Mouth Disease Inquiry Report." Pgs. 44 & 
75.  Slow burning pyres gave off acrid smoke, and as the number of pyres increased smoke became more apparent to 
communities near them.  Pyres had a negative public perception due to public health concerns.  Rendering became 
more common later in the outbreak, and had fewer effects on public health. 
17 Ibid. Pgs. 33-35. 
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Taiwan Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak 
Taiwan suffered an FMD outbreak in 1997.  On March 19, 1997 the first case of this 
outbreak in Taiwan was confirmed.  Following confirmation of the first case, 6,156 premises 
were reported to be infected.  Over a million pigs on these premises had been observed with 
clinical symptoms by the end of 1997.  Millions of pigs either died from the disease or were 
slaughtered during eradication efforts.18  Publicly available information about this outbreak is 
not as rich as that related to the 2001 UK outbreak, but problem areas are nonetheless apparent.  
At the beginning of the outbreak, different groups debated the best way to prevent further spread 
of disease and to eradicate the virus.  Farmers and meat processors were in favor of culling all 
animals.  Taiwan’s Council of Agriculture (COA), conversely, preferred a plan for disease 
control through vaccination, since the complete-cull plan could have serious economic, social, 
and political consequences.  Culling also posed serious environmental consequences due to 
carcass disposal concerns.19  With the facts concerning the economic and environmental 
consequences of both options available, Taiwan’s legislature adopted the COA’s 
recommendation.  All pigs on FMD-contaminated farms were to be destroyed, and all uninfected 
animals were to be vaccinated.20
                                                 
18 The combination of the stamping-out policy and a blanket vaccination policy was used to control the outbreak.  
Chinese Taipei, "Eradication of Foot-and-Mouth Disease in Chinese Taipei," (World Trade Organization, 
Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 2003). Pg. 1. 
  Taiwan had emergency response plans in place at the time of 
the 1997 outbreak.  If an FMD outbreak was suspected, veterinarians were to restrict the 
19 The high water table in Taiwan was an environmental concern when disposing of the millions of pigs culled to 
control the FMD outbreak.  Another challenge was the formulation of EPA regulations that took into consideration 
both local and regional environmental conditions in Taiwan.  Terrance M Wilson and Carol Tuszynski, "Foot-and-
Mouth Disease in Taiwan--1997 Overview," in 1997 Committee Reports--Committee on Epizootic Attack 
(Emergency Programs and CEAH: VS-APHIS-USDA, 1997). Pg. 3.  A water table is the “upper surface of a zone of 
saturation; the surface of the groundwater.”  The University of Arizona Cooperative Extension, "Youth Activities: 
Water Resources Glossary,"  http://ag.arizona.edu/waterquality/YouthActivityPages/Glossary.html. Accessed 
December 2010.  Water tables are affected by precipitation, and high when precipitation is high.  Burial is 
complicated by a high water tables due to concerns of surface water contamination and carcass resurfacing. 
20 Sophia Huang, "Taiwan's Hog Industry--3 Years after Disease Outbreak," Economic Research Service/USDA  
(October 2000). Pg. 1. 
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movement of animals from infected farms and destroy all sick, suspect, or potentially infected 
animals.21  Disinfection would follow this stage.  Vaccine boosters were to be given if deemed 
necessary.22
A problem arose in appraisal of value and reimbursement for animal loss.  The initial 
indemnity paid to farmers for their culled animals was significantly more than what they would 
have received for healthy animals at market value.  This led some farmers to intentionally bring 
FMD-infected animals to their uninfected farms to increase the amount they received for their 
animals.  The indemnity amounts were adjusted to more appropriate levels soon after the 
problem of intentional farm infection was discovered, but the actions of these farmers added to 
the rapid spread of FMD throughout Taiwan.
 
23  The emergency response plan for FMD 
outbreaks called for veterinarians to restrict the movement of all animals to and from infected 
farms.24  Despite this regulation, animal movements within the country still occurred and 
contributed to the scale of the outbreak.  The government of Taiwan was unable to completely 
shut down livestock markets, and this furthered disease-control setbacks due to continued animal 
movement.  Another factor contributing to continued animal movement was the fact that the 
outbreak occurred during the Chinese New Year, traditionally a time when animal movements 
increased.25
                                                 
21 To positively diagnose FMD, the presence of viral antigen or nucleic acid must be confirmed.  Test methods that 
can, and are being used, include enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays (ELISA), lateral flow devices (LFD), reverse 
transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), and virus isolation with cell culture.  After the disease is 
confirmed the serotype must be identified. OIE, "Foot and Mouth Disease," in OIE Terrestrial Manual: Manual of 
Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals 2009 (Paris: OIE, 2009). Chapter 2.1.5 Pg. 1. 
 
22 Chinese Taipei, "Eradication of Foot-and-Mouth Disease in Chinese Taipei." Pg. 5. 
23 Unknown, "Report on the 1997 Taiwan Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak in Swine." Pg. 8. 
24 Chinese Taipei, "Eradication of Foot-and-Mouth Disease in Chinese Taipei." Pg. 5. 
25 Melissa McLaws and Carl Ribble, "Description of Recent Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreaks in Nonendemic 
Areas: Exploring the Relationship between Early Detection and Epidemic Size," The Canadian Veterinary Journal 
48 (October 2007). Pg. 1057. 
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Taiwan may have had better communication networks in place during their outbreak than 
the UK did.  In Taiwan, an education program was developed to inform the general public about 
the FMD eradication process.  Multiple media outlets were used, including radio, television, 
video, advertising, newspapers, booklets, pamphlets, and posters.26  In 1999, a disease-reporting 
software system was introduced in Taiwan.  This computer network helped to link all 
government veterinary agencies at all levels by providing the latest, up-to-date information to 
anyone who had the authority to access it.27
Foot and Mouth Disease in Egypt 
   
Several serotypes of FMD have circulated, and currently circulate, in regions of the 
Middle East and Northern Africa. The most recent series of FMD outbreaks in Egypt began in 
early 2006. 28  Although a disease control program has been in place in Egypt to help control the 
spread of FMD outbreaks since before 2006, Egypt still faces sporadic outbreaks of FMD 
throughout the country.29
                                                 
26 Chinese Taipei, "Eradication of Foot-and-Mouth Disease in Chinese Taipei." Pg. 3. 
  The challenges faced by developing nations, like Egypt, differ from 
those of developed countries, like the UK.  A major challenge that affects the control of FMD in 
Egypt is a lack of resources that other, more developed nations may possess.  Veterinary services 
27 Ibid. Pg. 4. 
28  NJ Knowles et al., "Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus Serotype a in Egypt," Emerging Infectious Diseases 13, no. 
10 (2007 Oct), http://www.cdc.gov/EID/content/13/10/1593.htm. Accessed July 2010.  Articles vary regarding the 
dates of FMD outbreaks in Egypt prior to 2006.  Some data suggest outbreaks date back as early as 1950, with the 
most severe outbreak occurring in 1987. European Commission for the Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease, "Foot 
and Mouth Disease in Egypt," in Reports Archive: 33rd Session, ed. Agriculture and Consumer Protection 
Department Animal Production and Health Division (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
1999).  Other data suggest that there were no outbreaks of any serotype of FMD in Egypt between 1972 and 2000. 
Knowles et al., "Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus Serotype a in Egypt."  
29  In Egypt, to prevent FMD from entering the country, live cattle, sheep, pigs, or deboned meat and animal 
products are not permitted to be imported from countries that have not been free from FMD for at least 6 months.  
Animals that are imported are quarantined for 33 days, and then vaccinated against FMD O1.  When a premises is 
infected, it must be quarantined for 21 days following the recovery of the last infected animal.  Ring vaccination is 
used for contact premises.  Infected premises, farm utensils, and tools are to be disinfected.  Another method used to 
prevent the disease is mandatory vaccination.   European Commission for the Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease, 
"Foot and Mouth Disease in Egypt."  There may be various reasons that FMD continues to break out periodically in 
Egypt, but one may be a lack of disease reporting prior to importation of animals.  Another reason may be lack of 
cooperation between quarantine stations and authorities. Knowles et al., "Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus Serotype a 
in Egypt." Accessed November 2010. 
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often have to compete with other national governmental services for available resources.  Animal 
movement also presents a challenge.  Farmers regularly move animals across the countryside for 
grazing, watering, and trade.  These movements bring various susceptible species into contact 
with one another, and thus potentially spread disease.30  Herding of livestock throughout the 
countryside and through towns is a daily event.  This practice poses a high risk for disease 
transmission.31
Lessons Learned from the UK, Taiwan, and Egypt and Looking Toward the U.S. 
 
Taiwan, the UK, and Egypt have faced many issues during their respective FMD 
outbreaks, including their responses to the outbreaks and their preparation for future outbreaks.    
In the 1997 Taiwan FMD outbreak, movement restrictions and rapid spread of the virus due to 
animal movement proved to be very troublesome for outbreak control efforts.  By contrast, while 
these issues did affect the UK’s 2001 FMD outbreak response efforts, communication and 
disposal plans proved to be more considerable challenges in the UK FMD response efforts—
issues with which the Taiwanese government appeared to have experienced a measure of 
success.  Egypt, like Taiwan, also had problems with animal movements.  In contrast to Taiwan 
and the UK, Egypt had more trouble with resourcing because it is a developing country.   
The UK, Taiwan, and Egypt each had a national plan for TAD preparedness and 
response, but implementation at the local level raised problems.  In the UK, communication 
between national and local officials was one of the main sources of trouble for outbreak 
responders.  Updates and changes to the response plan had often been made at the national level, 
                                                 
30 FAO, "Improved Animal Health for Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Livelihoods," ed. Animal Production and 
Health Division FAO Agriculture Department (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
2002). Chapter 2. 
31 The author has visited areas surrounding Cairo, Egypt, and Fayoum University in Al Fayoum, Egypt, and 
observed some of the local agricultural practices.  The movement of animals across the countryside appeared to pose 
great potential for disease spread.  Spread of disease to animals through contact with each other, the land, water 
sources, and people appeared to be a great challenge.  
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but this information did not always reach the appropriate state personnel in the field.  This also 
affected communication between the state officials, the general public, and stakeholders.  In 
Taiwan, the federal government was challenged with movement restrictions.  Difficulties 
controlling the movement of swine from small local operations around markets and the initial 
inappropriate indemnity pricing plagued the government of Taiwan.  Better collaboration 
between the federal and state officials concerning markets and appropriate indemnity pricing 
may have helped to slow the rapid spread of the outbreak.  In Egypt, much of the trouble in 
preparing for and responding to TAD outbreaks has been, and still is a result of a lack of funding.  
National funding is not evenly distributed among the local veterinary authorities to properly 
prepare for and respond to outbreaks.  In the outbreaks in the UK, Taiwan, and Egypt, better 
collaboration and cooperation between the national and local governments could have helped to 
provide the countries with a better response to their outbreaks.  The lessons learned from these 
countries suggest that even with plans in place before outbreaks occur, problems still arise as an 
outbreak progresses.  These are important observations for U.S. Food and Agriculture Security 
officials.  Food and Agriculture Security is a U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
research area.  Food and agriculture are critical to the infrastructure of the U.S. according to 
DHS.32  It is a priority for ensuring the safety, security, and ongoing operation of the agriculture 
and food sector. 33
                                                 
32 Bush, "Homeland Security Presidential Directive-9." Pg. 1.  This directive instructs that the food and agriculture 
system should be protected from terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies. 
  To better understand why these deviations from the planned course occur, 
further research is needed.  Exploration of the concept of “disconnects” in the various “domains” 
of TAD emergency preparedness and response is one way to research this issue, particularly 
aspects related to collaboration and cooperation between federal and state levels of government.  
33Justin Kastner, "Introduction," in Food and Agriculture Security an Historical, Multidisciplinary Approach, ed. 
Justin Kastner (ABC-CLIO, 2010).   
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“Domains,” which refer to a broad dimension that is critical to emergency preparedness and 
response, may have specific subtopics.  “Disconnects” refer to the presence of documented 
inequalities or differences of understanding concerning a domain or domain sub-topic.  The areas 
of preparedness and response are part of the process of emergency management that also 
includes recovery and mitigation. Table 1 provides a complete list of conceptual definitions that 
are used in this research.  
Table 1 Definition of Terms Used in This Thesis 
Term Definition 
Domain A broad dimension critical to emergency preparedness and 
response; domains may have specific sub-topics.  
Government A political system administrating and regulating a body of 
people.  The local government is closest to those governed.  
The regional government involves groups of communities.  
The national government controls all the territory within its 
recognized borders. 
Disconnect The presence of a documented inequality or difference of 
understanding about a domain or domain sub-topic between 
levels of government. 
 
 Exploring emergency preparedness and response through “domains” and “disconnects” 
has led the author to develop questions for further research to be addressed in this thesis.  These 
questions relate to the U.S.’s ability to prepare for and respond to a TAD emergency.  Two 
research questions have been developed to guide the research embodied in this thesis. 
Research Questions 
1.  Within the U.S., what disconnects exist in the domains of communication, 
knowledge, and resourcing of emergency preparedness and response between the 
different levels of government, from federal to state, in the processes of planning for 
and responding to TAD emergencies? 
11 
 
2. How do these domain-specific disconnects affect Food and Agriculture Security in 
the U.S.? 
With the above research questions providing guidance, this thesis evaluates the 
capabilities of national and state levels of government to cooperate and coordinate with one 
another in preparation for and response to TAD emergencies/incidents within the U.S.  To that 
end, the thesis explores possible disconnects between federal and state units of government and 
responders, as well as how these disconnects may affect the security of a nation’s food and 
agricultural systems.34
Table 2 summarizes the actual domains of interest to the author in this study.  Each 
domain is divided into smaller subtopics so that disconnects can be more precisely identified.  
Each domain has been selected on the basis of its overall importance in the process of preparing 
for and responding to TAD emergencies. 
   
Table 2 Domains of Emergency Preparedness and Response Addressed in this 
Thesis 
Domains Communication Knowledge Resourcing 
Subtopics in  
Domains 
Command 
Structure  
Veterinary 
Workforce 
Training 
Equipment & 
Facilities 
 Network 
Communication 
Stakeholder 
Education 
Personnel 
  Plans 
(preventative, 
contingency, 
eradication) 
Finances 
 
                                                 
34 The author is a Homeland Security Career Development Fellow studying Food and Agriculture Security, which is 
a Department of Homeland Security research area.  The author’s interest in Food and Agricultural Security has been 
increased following her participation in the Future Homeland Security S&T Professionals Meeting (October 2009), 
2009 Annual AVMA Meeting (July 2009), Frontier Field trips to New Mexico State University (May 2009) and 
Washington DC (March 2010), Kansas Veterinary Medical Association (KVMA) day at the Capital (April 2010), 
and Kansas State Animal Response Team (KS SART) Companion Animal Decontamination Training (April 2010). 
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Communication is one of the most critical domains of emergency preparedness and 
response.  Coordinated and efficient systems must be in place in emergency situations to enable 
the rapid flow of key information to the appropriate parties.  A command structure must be in 
place for information to be efficiently analyzed so that rapid decision making can occur.  
Communication among members of this command structure is critical to the process.35  The 
ability to communicate through networks is also a significant aspect communication.  Multiple 
chains of command may be present among the varied networks needed to control a TAD 
emergency.36  Disease notification plays a critical role in a TAD outbreak, and communicating 
the discovery of a TAD to the proper authorities is a significant step in the process of disease 
preparedness and response.  Several organizations are responsible for TAD surveillance 
throughout the world.  The chain of communication throughout these organizations is vital in 
preparation for and response to an outbreak.  The three organizations that hold principal 
responsibility for this are the OIE, the FAO, and the World Health Organization (WHO).37
                                                 
35 The ability to make rapid decisions, convert those decisions into clear orders to be conveyed down the chain of 
command to those who will carry them out, and obtain results is required when handling a TAD emergency.  
Efficient mechanisms must be in place for the communication of information and instruction to be carried forward 
and back through the chain of command.  Roeder P.L. Geering W.A., Obi T.U., "Manual on the Preparation of 
National Animal Disease Emergency Preparedness Plans," FAO Animal Health Manual (Rome: Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1999). Chapter 2 paragraph 1. 
  An 
example of an important communication network established by these organizations is the 
36 Several federal and local organizations, concerned with both human and animal health, will likely be required to 
work together in a TAD emergency situation.  Negotiations and agreements should be made between these 
organizations on the most efficient mechanisms to coordinate responses and share responsibilities.  This allows for 
rapid exchange of emergency information, such as disease reports and epidemiological data, between organizations.  
Ibid. Chapter 1 paragraph 2. 
37 The OIE promotes transparency and fair trading requirements.  It also helps member countries improve their 
veterinary services and overall infrastructure.  Its member nations are therefore responsible for reporting the 
occurrence of any of the OIE listed diseases.  The FAO assists developing nations in responding to TADs.  The FAO 
is also responsible for management of the Emergency Prevention System (EMPRES).  The WHO, like the OIE, also 
promotes transparency and requires its member nations to report listed diseases.  Francios-Xavier Meslin and Corrie 
Brown, "International Efforts at Detection & Control," in Food Security in a Global Economy, ed. Gary  Smith and 
Allan M Kelly (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). Pgs. 160-161. 
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Global Outbreak Alert Response Network (GOARN), established by the WHO in 2000 to assist 
in the processes of information gathering and disease preparedness planning.38
In order for accurate information to reach public and private stakeholders, there must be 
both internal and external communication pathways to follow.
 
39  Communication to all the 
individuals involved in a TAD emergency is important, and communicating response strategies 
to stakeholders increases awareness of the nature and consequences of TAD emergencies.40  
Well-established relationships between livestock health agencies, producers, processors, and 
media organizations can greatly enhance communication efforts.41
Overall, the domain of communication is critical to acquiring trust and support from the 
public.  Communication must be balanced in the quantity of information provided, and in the 
quality and transparency presented.
   
42  The best TAD emergency preparedness and response 
plans will be rendered useless if communications are not received in a timely manner and are not 
transparent to all those involved.43
Another critical domain of emergency preparedness and response is that of knowledge.  
Knowledge of symptoms, diagnostic techniques, treatments, and control strategies for TADs is 
 
                                                 
38 The GOARN includes official members of the WHO and affiliates such as the Red Cross, the Red Crescent, and 
Médecins Sans Frontières.  Ibid. Pg. 161.  The GOARN helps keep the global community constantly up-to-date on 
outbreak threats.  It helps combat the spread of outbreaks globally, ensures that affected areas receive suitable 
assistance with technical issues, and contributes to long lasting outbreak preparedness.   World Health 
Organization, "Global Outbreak Alert & Response Network,"  http://www.who.int/csr/outbreaknetwork/en/. 
Accessed November 16, 2010. 
39 Cowen Paula McNamara Tracey S. Inskeep II William, Meade Barry J., Wainwright Sherrilyn Hart, Major Larsen 
Thomas, Crom Randall L., Kiley Michael P., Franz David R., Koons Robin K., Captain Bailey Hugh, Captain 
Thomas Todd M., Huxsoll David L, "Fifth Annual Emergency Preparedness Satellite Seminar" (paper presented at 
the Fifth Annual Emergency Preparedness Satellite Seminar, September 13-14, 2000 2000). 
40 Communication with farmers, stakeholders, and the general public is important, and sometimes neglected in TAD 
emergency preparation and response.  A sense of participation in the process can be attained through this 
communication.  Awareness and publicity campaigns, personal visits, and discussion groups are more ideal forms of 
communication.  Newspapers, radio, internet, and television can rapidly reach larger numbers of individuals.  
Geering W.A., "Manual on the Preparation of National Animal Disease Emergency Preparedness Plans." Chapter 4 
paragraphs 27 & 29. 
41 Kahrs Robert, Global Livestock Health Policy: Challenges, Opportunities, and Strategies for Effective Action, 
First ed. (Ames, IA: Iowa State Press, 2004). Pg. 13. 
42 Ibid. Pg. 24. 
43 Ibid. Pg. 13. 
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essential in preparedness and response.  Practical knowledge of or access to educational 
resources about these diseases is important for veterinarians.44  Levels of knowledge of TADs 
will vary for each individual and their involvement in the event.  Each individual responder will 
need a different level of knowledge to perform their role adequately.  Knowledge and the ability 
to discuss technicalities of the outbreak in a reliable manner are necessary for health officials to 
have professional credibility.  Without professional credibility, trust between responders and the 
public is difficult to establish.  Dispersal of inaccurate information or refusal to defer to more 
knowledgeable individuals hinders the process of emergency preparedness and response.45
It is important for both professionals and the public to be educated about the nature and 
consequences of TADs.  Farmers, companies, trade officials, other stakeholders, and the general 
public should have access to information about TADs and explanations for why they require 
preparation and response planning.  Extension services can provide information to the public and 
stakeholders through public meetings and printed educational media (brochures, pamphlets, 
posters, etc.).  Private consultants can also be queried for more specific information than that 
which is provided by most extension services.
 
46
Knowledge and rehearsal of specific TAD contingency plans is important.  Personnel 
who have the potential to be involved in the event should be aware of and trained in their roles.
 
47
                                                 
44 Veterinarians, veterinary technicians, and other animal health staff may be the first individuals to come in contact 
with an FAD and or TAD.  To be able to recognize the diseases when they come in contact with them, veterinarians 
must either have active knowledge or access to systematic and regularly scheduled training programs.  Geering 
W.A., "Manual on the Preparation of National Animal Disease Emergency Preparedness Plans." Chapter 4 
paragraph 18. 
  
For any contingency plan to be effective, it must be accessible and easily understood by all those 
45 Robert, Global Livestock Health Policy: Challenges, Opportunities, and Strategies for Effective Action. Pg. 233. 
46 Ibid. Pg. 258. 
47 Technical contingency plans outline strategies for disease detection, containment, and elimination.  They should 
also contain standard operating procedures, enterprise manuals, and individual officer job descriptions.  Geering 
W.A., "Manual on the Preparation of National Animal Disease Emergency Preparedness Plans." Chapter 6 
paragraph 2. 
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involved in disease emergency preparation and response.   Preparation and response efforts can 
be hindered by uninformed, untrained, or confused responders.  Trial exercises of contingency 
plans are also important for participants to gain knowledge of the plan’s effectiveness.  Plans that 
appear effective in writing may not be effective in practice.  Trial exercises also help train 
responders who were not actively involved in the initial development of the plan. 
Knowledge in TAD emergency preparedness and response is critical.  All individuals 
involved, from the top animal health officials to the general public, should have knowledge of 
what to expect to prevent or respond to a TAD emergency.  The domain of communication 
intertwines deeply with the domain of knowledge, as most knowledge is obtained through 
communication.    
A third domain critical to TAD emergency preparedness and response is resourcing.  
Resourcing is a core component of preparation for emergencies.  However, the role and use of 
these resources becomes more critical in the response phase.  Numerous resources (financing, 
manpower, equipment, land, buildings, etc.) may be needed to respond to a TAD emergency.  A 
critical step to prepare for TAD outbreaks should be to itemize all resources that are currently 
available for use in case of emergency, as well as those that will need to be acquired.  
Discrepancies between these two lists provide information on areas that will require further 
procurement of resources.48
Early warnings and reactions, as part of contingency planning, require having the 
capacity to apply the necessary resources needed to counter a TAD emergency efficiently.
 
49
                                                 
48 Ibid. Chapter 6. 
  
Surveillance programs can assist in early warning efforts.  Operation and support of surveillance 
systems requires extensive resources.  Effective surveillance and early warning systems require 
49 Ibid. Introduction paragraph 10-11. 
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field personnel, laboratory facilities, testing supplies, and finances to all be appropriately 
allocated.  Appropriate time allocation is also important, as many surveillance programs have 
difficulty procuring the resources necessary to conduct a sufficient assessment of population 
disease levels. 
Alongside contingency plans for specific TADs, resource and financial plans should be 
part of TAD emergency preparedness and response, and these plans should have legislative 
backing. Access to adequate resources requires support from federal and state governments, 
farming communities and organizations, and livestock marketers and traders. Failure to have 
resource and financial plans in place prior to a TAD emergency can restrict emergency efforts.  
National government agencies may not be the only source of financial support; public-private 
partnerships may be arranged prior to a TAD emergency to provide extra funding.  It is not 
uncommon for a TAD emergency preparedness and response effort to exhaust, or go beyond, the 
resources and finances available in the affected country.  To provide additional funds and 
resources, international agreements should also be part of early planning efforts. 50
Animal disease control centers are important during an animal disease emergency.  In the 
U.S., the Plum Island Animal Disease Center holds the responsibility for being a disease control 
center.  Plum Island helps protect U.S. animal industries and exports (livestock, crops, etc.) from 
TADs through research and diagnosis.
     
51  It provides resources during an emergency at both state 
and national levels.52
                                                 
50 Ibid. Chapter 6. The federal and state governments may establish agreements with other countries or organizations 
outside the United States to provide extra resources.  The agreements enhance TAD outbreak preparedness and 
response plans because of the communication networks and extra resources they provide. 
  All national animal disease control centers maintain the inventory lists 
51 Luis L Rodriguez, "About Us: Plum Island Animal Disease Center," United States Department of Agriculture 
Agricultural Research Service, http://www.ars.usda.gov/AboutUs/AboutUs.htm?modecode=19-40-00-00. Accessed 
June 2010. 
52 Animal disease control centers can be involved in resourcing by maintaining up-to-date lists of available 
personnel and other resources, deploying staff, ordering and dispensing supplies, and administering finances.  These 
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necessary for resource planning.  The resources on the inventory list are also ordered and 
dispersed from this location.  This center deploys resources (personnel, equipment, finances) to 
the state animal disease control centers.  Disease control officers at the state centers use the 
provided resources to perform their duties and for education.53
Equipment, facilities, personnel, and finances are all necessary in a TAD emergency 
preparedness and response plan.  It is not uncommon, even if all the above planning steps are 
taken, for resources to be exhausted during such an emergency.  For this reason, it is critical for 
the federal and state levels of government to have established relationships and communication 
networks with potential outside resource suppliers.    
 
The domain of resourcing is intimately intertwined with the other two domains 
highlighted in this thesis—communication and knowledge.  Communication is necessary for 
making known the availability and/or deficiency of resources, as well as for finding outside 
suppliers to provide missing resources.  Knowledge is necessary for enabling policy makers and 
responders to understand what resources are needed in order for TAD emergency preparedness 
and response efforts to succeed.  Accurate resourcing requires knowledge of which testing kits 
are the most accurate, where the nearest capable laboratories are, what personnel to deploy, 
where to deploy personnel, and who to contact when a TAD outbreak occurs.  All of these 
domains are related, and they provide a strong foundation for emergency preparedness and 
response plans. 
The domains and subtopics discussed above do not represent an exhaustive list of all 
domains and topics related to TAD preparedness and response.  The three domains identified 
                                                                                                                                                             
roles will vary between the national and local centers.  Geering W.A., "Manual on the Preparation of National 
Animal Disease Emergency Preparedness Plans." Chapter 2 paragraphs 9 & 13. 
53 Lubroth Juan Geering W.A., "Preparation of Foot-and-Mouth Disease Contingency Plans," FAO Animal Health 
Manual (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2002). Chapter 8. 
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appear to be the most comprehensive and are well documented; they provide a reasonable set of 
areas in which to search for disconnects.  The more specific subtopics are also somewhat 
comprehensive; they facilitate the study of particular topics within each of the domains.  Other 
domains and subtopics could be proposed, but the author contends that the selected domains and 
subtopics provide a sufficiently robust context for this thesis. 
Methods 
To review, this thesis considers two questions: 
1. Within the U.S., what disconnects exist in the domains of communication, 
knowledge, and resourcing of emergency preparedness and response between the 
different levels of government, from federal to state, in the processes of planning for 
and responding to TAD emergencies?How do these domain-specific disconnects 
affect Food and Agriculture Security in the U.S.? 
In an effort to answer these questions, three separate methods were used.  These methods 
included literature review, direct observation, and personal interviews.  The author first 
conducted a literature review of past TAD emergency response reports.54
                                                 
54 After Action Reports (AARs) from disease outbreak exercises (no clinical disease present at the time) conducted 
by individual states, such as Kansas and Texas, have been analyzed for similar disconnects that occur during these 
training sessions. 
  The author reviewed 
more than a dozen response reports for potential disconnects.  These reports refer to areas of 
concern identified during actual outbreaks or exercises (simulated outbreak conditions).  The 
lessons learned from these events were used to help identify disconnects in TAD emergency 
preparedness and response plans.  The author also reviewed literature concerning TAD control, 
emergency management, agricultural security, and public health; web searches and online 
database queries were conducted to procure materials that were unavailable in print. 
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The author used direct observations at conferences, seminars, exercises, and field trips 
relating to TAD emergency preparedness and response to help answer the research questions.55  
The author attended two exercises simulating TAD outbreaks.  Direct observations can be 
advantageous because actual behavior and responses are viewed—not just read about.  This 
technique can also help reveal how a response unfolds.  These revelations can be used to develop 
theories to test for further study.  Direct observations can be used to verify and establish a level 
of confidence in conclusions.56  Potential biases are inherent in direct observation.  The method 
effect may bias the data collected.  The method effect involves a researcher influencing the 
observed individual through either their presence or their actions.  To avoid this, unobtrusive 
observation should be used whenever possible.  The data collected are also influenced by the 
researcher’s decisions about what should and should not be noted during the observations.  The 
use of other research methods helps to verify data collected through direct observation.57
Personal interviews were also conducted with U.S. Food and Agriculture Security 
experts.  Those interviewed included homeland security experts, state and federal veterinarians, 
and area emergency coordinators.  The experts that were interviews for this thesis currently work 
in either Kansas or Washington, D.C.  While they currently work in these locations, many of 
them have also worked in other locations throughout the U.S.  Therefore, the experts interviewed 
have knowledge of issues faced by locations other than the ones in which they are currently 
working.   At their convenience, state and national veterinarians, agricultural officials, and other 
animal disease control officials were interviewed through either direct contact or phone 
           
                                                 
55 The author has attended emergency preparedness exercises and training sessions while conducting this research 
project.  Observations and lessons learned from these exercises will help answer the research questions posed in this 
thesis.  Observations from conferences such as the Annual AVMA Conference and Future Homeland Security S&T 
Professionals Meeting have also been sources of data analyzed. 
56 Jarol B. Manheim and Richard C. Rich, Empirical Political Analysis: Research Methods in Political Science, 4th 
ed. (White Plains N. Y.: Longman Publishers USA, 1995). Pg. 201. 
57 Ibid. Pgs. 214-217. 
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conversation.  These interviews helped provide understanding of the experiences of the 
respondents.58  This information will differ from the information gained from the literature 
reviews.  Personal insights into interactions between responders and relationships can be gained 
from interviews, which are not available in written reports such as lessons learned.  Elite 
interviews were used to attain information that the respondent alone may possess.59  A slightly 
different set of questions was posed to each respondent so that their particular expertise in their 
area could be tapped.  Admittedly, the data collected during these personal interviews have a 
large potential for bias, which occurs largely in the respondent’s reactions to the interviewer, the 
questions, and the setting of the interview.60  Although numerous steps were taken to reduce the 
potential for bias,61
Exploring the issue of “domains” and “disconnects” through both literature-based as well 
as interview-based research is not a unique idea.  Though other scholars may not use the terms 
“domain” and “disconnect,” many have explored these concepts in their research.  For example, 
one study used a blended approach of literature review and personal interviews to look at state 
intergovernmental cooperation in disaster recovery plans.  The authors investigated state 
intergovernmental relations in post-disaster situations, as well as the challenges presented by 
 the author recognizes that bias, however slight, may yet be present in the 
data collected from personal interviews.  Nevertheless, the research approach embodied in this 
thesis is similar to those embraced by other scholars, and it provides a reasonable and robust way 
to answer the research questions.   
                                                 
58 Irving Seidman, Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for Researchers in Education and the Social 
Sciences, 3rd ed. (New York, NY: Teachers College Press, 2006). Pg. 9. 
59 Rich Richard C Manheim Jarol B, Empirical Political Analysis: Research Methods in Political Science, 4th ed. 
(White Plains N. Y.: Longman Publishers USA, 1995).  Pg. 162. 
60 Ibid. Pg. 155. 
61 Steps taken to reduce respondent bias included: wording questions in the shortest form possible, making questions 
as unambiguous as possible, avoiding use of the words “and/or” in a question, avoiding questions that encourage one 
response rather than another, avoiding argumentative questions, avoiding use of wording in a question that is 
unfamiliar to a respondent, and providing the possibility of not having an opinion or answer to a question.  Ibid. Pgs. 
157-160. 
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limited coordination, uncertainty, conflict among officials, and other disputes.62  This author’s 
research is similar to the “disconnect” issue investigated in this thesis.  Research concerning the 
failures of Hurricane Katrina63 relief efforts also highlight challenges similar to those explored in 
this thesis.  One article describes the resourcing challenges presented by the evacuation process 
and availability of shelters.64  Another article, more opinion-based, describes the failures in 
personnel, organization, communication, and bureaucracy.65  These articles investigate concepts 
similar to the “domain” issues of communication and resourcing.  Failures and challenges 
associated with natural disaster response comprise most of the publicly available research, but 
infectious disease pandemics have also been studied for related problems using similar methods.  
An article in the Journal of Public Health Management and Practice uses the combined methods 
of literature review, database searches, and personal interviews to research the planning involved 
in the 1918 pandemic influenza outbreak.66
                                                 
62 This article provides examples of a methodology and research topic that are similar to those used in this thesis.  
Clair B. Rubin and Daniel G. Barbee, "Disaster Recovery and Hazard Mitigation: Bridging the Intergovernmental 
Gap," Public Administration Review 45 (1985). 
  This article investigates a number of concepts 
similar to both “domains” and “disconnects.”  Integration of physicians into health care plans is a 
concept similar to the “domain” of resourcing.  The analysis of the different state and state plans 
63 Hurricane Katrina made landfall along the Gulf Coast of the U.S. on August 29, 2005.  It affected the states of 
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. 
64 This article is an example of similar research into resourcing misappropriation.  Evacuation transportation and 
shelter availability are the two key resourcing challenges discussed in this article.  Joanne M. Nigg, John Barnshaw, 
and Manuel R. Torres, "Hurricane Katrina and the Flooding of New Orleans: Emergent Issues in Sheltering and 
Temporary Housing," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 604, no. 113 (2006). 
65 This article is more of an opinion based article than a research project.  It still represents an investigation into 
similar issues as those studied in this thesis.  Ron Westrum, "All Coherence Gone: New Orleans as a Resilience 
Failure,"  http://www.resilience-engineering.org/REPapers/Westrum.pdf. Accessed June 2010. 
66 Similar research is done in this article regarding personnel resourcing disconnects.  The failure to integrate 
physicians into state and local response plans is an example of a disconnect.  Jacob Lauer, Justin Kastner, and 
Abbey Nutsch, "Primary Care Physicians and Pandemic Influenza: An Appraisal of the 1918 Experience and an 
Assessment of Contemporary Planning," Journal of Public Health Management and Practice 14, no. 4 (2008). 
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is similar to the issue of “disconnects.”67
Thesis Structure and Forecast of Chapters 
  This thesis’ analysis involves identification of 
disconnects that emerge from the literature review, direct observations, and personal interviews. 
In the following chapters, the domains and their subtopics will be analyzed in an effort to 
answer the above research questions.  Chapter two will explore the domain of communication 
and its subtopics.  Chapter three will explore the domain of knowledge.  Chapter four will cover 
the last domain of resourcing.  Chapters two, three, and four will begin with a reintroduction of 
the domains and their importance.  Following this introduction, the chapters will explore the 
observed disconnects present within each domain through document and literature analysis, 
direct observations, and personal interviews.  Each chapter will close with a discussion of the 
discovered disconnects, as well as their impact on Food and Agriculture Security. The final 
chapter, five, will combine the conclusions reached from previous chapters and describe the 
significance of the thesis project’s findings in the area of Food and Agriculture Security research. 
The author of this thesis is a Department of Homeland Security Career Development 
Fellow and Master of Public Health student, who aspires to work within government services in 
the prevention of and response to TAD outbreaks within the U.S.  This thesis was written in an 
effort to learn what domains of TAD outbreak preparedness and response were in need of 
improvement.  The findings presented here may be stepping stones for further research into 
solutions for the discovered disconnects. The author hopes that the questions answered in this 
thesis will provide future scholars with ideas for further investigation and analysis.
                                                 
67 Ibid. Pgs. 382-384. 
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Chapter 2: Disconnect Analysis of the Domain of Communication 
Introduction 
 The domain of communication in TAD preparedness and response holds great value.  It is 
the central domain of the three domains explored in this thesis.  In the event of a TAD outbreak, 
communication must flow rapidly and efficiently in order for preparation and response efforts to 
be successful.  The chain of command, communication networks, and risk communication pose 
complex problems in the domain of communication. The potential disconnects in these areas are 
numerous. 
   It is difficult to establish successful chains of command and communication networks.  
Many plans look adequate in print, but they fail to measure up when used in the event of an 
actual TAD outbreak.  The complex nature of the world today makes the process even more 
complicated.  A TAD outbreak can seriously threaten a country’s economy and food supply, and  
success of the command chain and timely release of information can ultimately save or condemn 
the affected industry.    
The next section pays special attention to disconnects within the domain of 
communication, featuring insights from the TAD preparedness and response literature, 
interviews with experts, and direct observations. 
Analysis 
Simulation exercises are a common way to test TAD preparedness and response plans so 
that officials can observe the strengths and weaknesses of the plans.  After action reports (AARs) 
from these exercises present valuable information useful in the analysis of disconnects between 
federal and state levels of government.   
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 Laboratories active in TAD response efforts communicate with other laboratories 
throughout the country and with animal health officials to exchange information regarding test 
results.  In order for response efforts to be successful, test results must be effectively 
communicated to the correct individuals at the correct locations.  In a series of exercises 
simulating potential outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), potential 
disconnects were identified in the communication of test results, specifically the failure of these 
results to reach the correct location.  During the simulation, participants discovered that sample 
identification numbers in the laboratory information management system (LIMS) did not 
correspond with those used by the United States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) 
Emergency Management Response System (EMRS).  This lack of correlation meant that 
laboratory technicians were forced to seek out additional information from sample labels—often 
difficult to read—in order to accurately communicate the results.68
 Notification of the TAD outbreak is an important aspect of the domain of 
communication. Notification involves communicating the occurrence of a TAD to U.S. state and 
federal government officials as well as animal health officials of global organizations.  After a 
suspected TAD outbreak has been identified, samples are taken from the affected animals and 
sent into laboratories for testing.  Initial test results are either “negative” or “presumptive-
positive.”
  Such lack of correlation 
between the sample identification systems serves as an example of a communication disconnect.   
69
                                                 
68 Joel Silverman and Rosemary Speers, ""A Wing and a Prayer" Summary and Analysis of the NAHLN HPAI 
Exercise Program," (2009). Pg. 63.  Also complicating this disconnect was a lack of an electronic interface between 
the National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) LIMS repositories and EMERS.  To relay test results, 
faxes or phone calls were used.   
  Following a presumptive-positive test result, further tests are needed confirm the 
positive result and to determine the specific strain of the disease.  The notification process begins 
69 Preliminary diagnostic tests conducted by the laboratory to indicate whether or not “disease’ is present.  The 
results of theses test are either presumptive-positive or presumptive negative.  Presumptive-positive test results 
require further testing for confirmation of the disease.   
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during the time that these confirmatory tests are performed.  This process can become a 
disconnect when there is ambiguity regarding the timing of the announcement and the 
person/agency responsible.  This ambiguity has been illustrated in TAD simulation exercises.  
Confusion can arise among participants—state, state, and federal—about whether notification 
proceedings should start after the initial presumptive-positive test result or after confirmation of 
the results.70
 In the event of a TAD outbreak, a federal declaration of emergency increases the 
availability of numerous response resources.  The federal government will declare a state of 
emergency once state and state offices have provided sufficient evidence that the outbreak is 
severe enough to require federal support.
   
71
                                                 
70 Silverman and Speers, ""A Wing and a Prayer" Summary and Analysis of the NAHLN HPAI Exercise Program." 
Pg. 19.  When a local veterinarian suspects a TAD case, they report the disease to a state veterinarian or livestock 
commissioner.  Foreign animal disease diagnosticians (FADDs) are then dispatched to investigate the case and 
collect samples if necessary.  The FADD will send the samples to a certified laboratory capable of testing for the 
disease of interest.  Once the sample is received, the laboratory will run diagnostic tests to either confirm or deny the 
presence of the disease on a presumptive basis.  This test result may be either falsely positive or negative.  This is 
partly why federal government officials prefer to wait for further confirmatory tests (serotyping) before they declare 
the disease present.  If the presumptive-positive result turns out to be negative, then the industry could have been 
negatively impacted by an early declaration of disease when there was no disease actually present.  On the opposite 
side, full response resources and actions are not available until the disease is declared, and waiting for further 
confirmation may result in further spread of the disease. 
  Disconnects and communication errors can occur 
during this exchange of information.  Examples of these errors include: incorrect or insufficient 
information submitted by states to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 
incorrect information exchanged through the FEMA chain of command, misinterpreted 
attainment of the requirements to qualify for a federal declaration of emergency, and delayed 
71 “As set forth in the Stafford Act, a governor seeks a presidential declaration by submitting a written request to the 
President through the FEMA regional office.  In this request the Governor certifies that the combined local, county, 
and state resources are insufficient and that the situation is beyond their recovery capabilities.  Following a FEMA 
regional and national office review of the request and the findings of the preliminary damage assessment, FEMA 
provides the President an analysis of the situation and a recommend course of action.”  FEMA, "Declaration Process 
Fact Sheet," FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/media/fact_sheets/declaration_process.shtm. Accessed September 2010. 
26 
 
communication at FEMA and to the president of the U.S.  These disconnects further decrease 
already insufficient resources.72
 The Stafford Act, which provides guidelines for federal declarations of emergencies, does 
not have specific provisions for TAD outbreaks.
 
73
 Effective communication in the early stages of a TAD outbreak is vital.  The early 
communication process can be a source of confusion.  The issue of how information exchange 
will occur prior to disease confirmation has been raised numerous times.  This information 
exchange should occur through a secure and confidential communication network to prevent 
premature leaks of information that could cause undue panic.  Individuals need to be identified 
who can be trusted with this information.  The quarantine and stop movement message to the 
public needs to be developed.  A disconnect may occur if these communication issues are not 
discussed  and resolved among the state and federal animal health and government officials prior 
to an actual TAD outbreak.
  This may add to the communication 
disconnect relating to federal emergency declaration.  Delays or rejections of requests for 
declaration can arise.  Discussions and agreements that must take place to provide the necessary 
resources can cause these delays.   
74
 TAD outbreaks are initially handled at a state level.
     
75
                                                 
72 Javier M. Ekboir, Potential Impact of Foot-and-Mouth Disease in California: The Role and Contribution of 
Animal Health Surveillance and Monitoring Services (Davis, CA: Regents of the University of California 
Agricultural Issues Center, 1999). Pg. 43. 
  The federal government becomes 
more intensely involved once a federal emergency is declared.  A communication network is 
73 Analytic Services Inc., "High Plains Guardian: Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA)," (Topeka: 
National Agricultural Biosecurity Center Kansas State University, Adjutant General State of Kansas, ANSER, 
2004). Pg. 18. 
74 "NAHLN FMD Table Top Exercise in Topeka Kansas,"  (2010). 
75 After a dispatched FADD has sent samples to the laboratory for testing, local level response efforts begin.  The 
affected premises may be quarantined and biosecurity measures may be established to prevent further spread of the 
potential disease.  After a presumptive-positive test result is received, further restrictions will likely be put in place 
at the local level to contain the disease.  Local surveillance will also be going on at this time to identify animals that 
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established between state and federal levels of government so they can work together to respond 
to an outbreak.  However, a potential disconnect in communication between the state and federal 
levels may occur prior to a declaration of emergency.76
 Diagnostic tests are run at state (if there is an approved state laboratory) and federal 
laboratories to confirm the presence of a TAD.  Diagnostic results from these laboratories must 
be reported to appropriate individuals.
  The state has initial control of all TAD 
outbreaks.  The federal government gains information about the situation only if the state 
government communicates the information. 
77  Confusion regarding who should versus who wants to 
receive these results is a potential source of disconnects.78
 State and federal animal health officials must have well-established communication 
capabilities with state livestock owners during TAD outbreaks.  Information concerning 
quarantine, biosecurity, carcass disposal, decontamination, and indemnity must be readily 
available to those affected.  This communication cannot effectively take place if the roles and 
responsibilities of those providing the information are not clear.  A disconnect can occur if state 
  Expedient communication between 
laboratories and animal health officials is essential for appropriate response efforts.  Disconnects 
occur in the absence of a well-established chain of communication between the state and federal 
levels of government and the laboratories. 
                                                                                                                                                             
may have been in contact with the source or sources of the disease.  Stop-movement orders may also be issued to 
prevent further entry or exit of the disease from the area.  Housing and care for animals detained due to the stop 
movement must also be provided.  These are all measures that the local level of government should be prepared to 
take prior to the involvement of the federal government.   
76 Interview with Dr. Barry Erlick Animal Health and Homeland Security Expert, Personal Interview, Oct 21 2010. 
77 Individuals who may receive diagnostic reports include, but are not limited to, the USDA/APHIS state Area 
Veterinarian in Charge (AVIC), the state veterinarian, and the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture. 
78 Interview with Dr. Barry Erlick Animal Health and Homeland Security Expert. 
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and federal animal health officials are unclear as to who is responsible for providing this 
information.  This disconnect can extend to the method of communication.79
Good personal interaction and mutual trust are key components of successful 
communication.
 
80  Good relationships between state and federal agencies involved in containing 
an outbreak are also important.81  These relationships can be adversely affected by personality 
and ego conflicts among personnel.  Through previous outbreaks or exercises, certain states have 
more experience than others in communicating and organizing with the federal government.  
These prior experiences help establish communication networks and personal relationships that 
could assist in later outbreaks.82  Personality and ego conflicts, and inadequate professional 
working relationships, may all contribute to a communication disconnect.  Anti-federal 
government sentiment, present in some states, may also contribute to the communication 
disconnect.83
 Communication throughout the chain of command can be affected by bureaucracy, which 
can hinder inter-agency and intra-agency communication at both the federal and the state levels.  
As more agencies become involved in TAD outbreak preparedness and response efforts, there is 
an increase in the layers of communication through which information needs to pass.  
 
                                                 
79 Ibid.  The information must be in forms that are accessible to the intended audiences.  Those responsible for 
providing it must know what information outlets are appropriate.  Therefore, the communication disconnect with the 
livestock owners also occurs when they cannot access the information due to inappropriate information outlets. 
80 Interview with Dr. William Brown Kansas Livestock Commissioner, Personal Interview, October 14 2010, 
Interview with Dr. David F. Vogt Kansas Area Veterinarian in Charge Personal Interview, Oct 22 2010, Interview 
with Sandy Johnson Kansas Department of Agriculture Homeland Security Specialist, Personal Interview, Oct 14 
2010.  This was a recurring theme throughout the author’s interviews.   
81 Interview with Dr. William Brown Kansas Livestock Commissioner. 
82 Interview with Sandy Johnson Kansas Department of Agriculture Homeland Security Specialist.  Mrs. Johnson 
noted that the state of Kansas has well-established relationships between the state and federal agencies that would be 
involved in a TAD outbreak. 
83 Interview with Dr. David F. Vogt Kansas Area Veterinarian in Charge   Dr. Vogt noted that some states are more 
“anti-fed” than others, and this may lead to decreased cooperation between the state veterinarian (state government 
official) and the Area Veterinarian in Charge (AVIC) (federal government official). Interview with Sandy Johnson 
Kansas Department of Agriculture Homeland Security Specialist.  Mrs. Johnson also commented on the potential for 
a communication disconnect between state and federal animal health officials. 
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Communication networks become more confusing and complicated as they expand.  Disconnects 
can happen when bureaucracy slows communications or when communications get lost due to 
the complexity of the network.84
 Information regarding plans, regulations, and policies needs to be part of the 
communication process.  Each state may have different TAD outbreak preparedness and 
response plans, regulations, and policies.  The federal government also has its own version of 
information needed for TAD preparation and outbreak response.  This information is scattered 
between the state and federal government agencies, and is not available in one place.  The lack of 
a single source to communicate this information may cause a disconnect.
  
85
 During the course of a TAD outbreak, information regarding the status of the outbreak is 
communicated to the public through numerous media outlets.  A potential disconnect occurs 
when it is unclear whether the state or federal government is responsible for providing this 
communication.  Questions arise relating to what information should be communicated, who 
should communicate it, when it should be communicated, and how it should be communicated.
 
86
 Language barriers can also be a source of a communication disconnect.  State and federal 
government officials must be able to communicate with the general public involved in the 
outbreak.  At times, interpreters may be needed to communicate with the farmers and their staff.  
When personnel are not available to interpret, communication breaks down.  Communication 
 
                                                 
84 Interview with Dr. William Brown Kansas Livestock Commissioner.  Dr. Brown noted that, in Kansas, the 
separation of the Kansas Animal Health Department form the Kansas Department of Agriculture made the agency 
more responsive and adaptable.  This was, in part, due to the fact that communications had to go through fewer 
layers and bureaucracy.  Interview with Sandy Johnson Kansas Department of Agriculture Homeland Security 
Specialist.  Mrs. Johnson noted that this same separation also had the potential to be harmful to communication.  
The separation of the departments made communication between them more complicated, as personnel had to know 
when and where communications were taking place to receive them.  Information sharing would, according to Mrs. 
Johnson, be easier if the departments were under the same roof.  The author extrapolated that this intrastate 
communication disconnect could also extend to state and federal agency/department communication. 
85 Interview with Sandy Johnson Kansas Department of Agriculture Homeland Security Specialist. 
86 Ibid.  Mrs. Johnson brought up the issue of phone banks in her interview with the author.  Questions into who was 
responsible for setting up the phone bank, who needed to answer the phones, and who would be accepted by the 
public to be answering the phone were brought up. 
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should also consider cultural differences.  Personnel must be able to understand cultural 
differences, especially when those differences may alter the way a message is understood.87
 Communicating with industry, stakeholders, and the general public is part of TAD 
outbreak preparedness and response.  Better plans can be constructed, better organization can be 
established, and more effective responses can occur if animal health officials communicate 
properly with these groups.  Disconnects between these groups and the state and federal 
government can occur when they do not effectively communicate with one another.  Industry 
officials and the general public may have concerns and ideas related to TAD outbreak 
preparedness and response.  The state and federal levels of government can improve their plans 
and response efforts by establishing communication networks with these groups.
  
88
 AARs are often written after TAD outbreak simulation exercises in an effort to document 
the information garnered from the exercises (i.e., lessons learned).  The reports are usually made 
available to the individuals and groups that were involved in the exercise.  The lessons learned 
from these exercises are not always communicated to state and federal government officials who 
were not directly involved in the exercise.  This potential lack of communication is a disconnect.  
If the lessons learned from these exercises are not shared among all potential groups involved in 
TAD outbreaks, the experience may not result in optimal learning.  A disconnect can also occur 
if the policies that are developed from these exercises are not communicated between the state 
and federal levels of government.
 
89
                                                 
87 Interview with Dr. David F. Vogt Kansas Area Veterinarian in Charge  
 
88 Ibid. 
89 Interview with Craig Beardsley NABC Project Administrator, Personal Interview, Oct 6 2010. 
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 It is important that policy changes are communicated between the state and federal levels 
of government.90  It is also important for government officials to communicate this information 
to diagnostic laboratories.  Disconnects can occur when the policy changes are not 
communicated to those whom they affect.  Delays in communication can also be attributed to 
this disconnect.  For example, if the federal government were to change its policies regarding 
which diagnostic tests were acceptable, and with whom diagnostic test results should be shared, a 
failure to communicate this information with diagnostic laboratories would adversely affect 
diagnosticians’ ability to perform their role.91
Conclusions 
   
 The table below, which lists the communication disconnects that emerged through 
literature review, direct observations, and personal interviews, will be followed by a discussion 
of the disconnects and their significance to Food and Agriculture Security. 
Table 3 Disconnects in the Domain of Communication 
Disconnects 
Failure of laboratories and federal agencies to correlate 
their sample identification systems  
Confusion regarding the timing of and responsibility for 
notification 
Inadequate information sharing between the state and 
federal government to attain a federal declaration of 
emergency 
Failure of Stafford Act to cover TAD* outbreaks  
Lack of established communication plans between the 
state and federal government 
Failure to adequately share information  prior to federal 
declaration of emergency 
                                                 
90 It is important for information regarding policy changes to also reach individuals outside the government.  Local 
veterinarians, farmers, and even the general public may need to be informed of policy changes. 
91 Interview with Craig Beardsley NABC Project Administrator. 
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Confusion regarding the chain of communication for test 
results 
Confusion regarding responsibility of communication 
decisions 
Lack of working professional relationships, poor 
personal relationships, and  personality conflicts  
Bureaucratic interference 
Lack of a single communication resource to share plans, 
regulations, and guidelines 
Inability to overcome language and cultural barriers 
Lack  of communication networks with industry, 
stakeholders, and civilians 
Failure to share lessons learned from simulations,  
AARs**, and real events 
Failure to share information with laboratories 
concerning policy changes 
*TAD: Transboundary Animal Disease 
**AAR: After Action Report 
 
The National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) is a group of state diagnostic 
laboratories that actively and passively surveys the U.S. for animal diseases in cooperation with 
the USDA.  These laboratories are located throughout the country to provide convenient 
locations for rapid diagnosis and support in the event of a TAD outbreak.  The NAHLN and its 
surveillance capabilities are directed by Homeland Security Presidential Directive-9 to protect 
U.S. infrastructure.92
The first disconnect relates to discrepancies between the sample identification systems of 
the NAHNL laboratories and federal government agencies.  During TAD outbreaks, foreign 
  Three of the disconnects that emerged in this chapter concern laboratory 
communication.   
                                                 
92Lee M Myers, "Agriculture and Food Defense," in Homeland Security Protecting America's Targets, ed. James JF 
Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006). Pg. 184.  Agriculture and Food Defense and Security 
are part of protecting the critical infrastructure of the U.S. 
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animal disease diagnosticians (FADDs) collect samples to be sent to the NAHLN laboratories.  
These samples are labeled according to the animal and premises from which they were taken.  
The samples are sent to a NAHLN laboratory for testing to either confirm or deny the presence 
of the disease.  The USDA sends sample identification information through the EMRS.  Samples 
are given identification numbers through both these of systems, but they are not the same 
numbers.  When the NAHLN laboratory sends test results to the USDA, technicians must rely on 
information other than tracking numbers, which are usually hand-written on test tubes.  
Information can be misread, and therefore the results could be inappropriately assigned.93
The second disconnect relates to communication between the federal government and the 
NAHLN laboratories regarding policy changes that may affect the procedures and diagnostic 
capabilities of the laboratory.  The laboratory network is supposed to function under standardized 
protocols and procedures.
  The 
failure of the NAHLN laboratory and federal agencies to correlate their identification systems 
could lead to confusion regarding sample results and loss of time.   These losses could be 
detrimental to the surveillance and diagnostic capabilities that the laboratories provide for Food 
and Agriculture Security.   
94
The third disconnect relates to the communication of test results.  The laboratory 
standards for procedures and protocols should use the chain of communication for test results.  
There are a number of individuals who need to receive results, including the U.S. Secretary of 
Agriculture, the state AVIC, and the state veterinarian.  If the laboratory lacks an established 
  These may change due to policy changes, and delayed 
communication of these changes may affect the time and resources needed for laboratory 
operations.   
                                                 
93 Silverman and Speers, ""A Wing and a Prayer" Summary and Analysis of the NAHLN HPAI Exercise Program." 
Pgs. 62-63. 
94 Myers, "Agriculture and Food Defense." Pg. 184. 
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chain of communication regarding who should receive results and when, security and timing of 
communications may be compromised. 
 Several disconnects in the domain of communication are the result of poorly established, 
ineffectively used communication networks.  Lack of communication networks between the 
federal and state levels of government and industry, stakeholders, and civilians delays the 
process of information sharing.  These delays give rise to various risks in Food and Agriculture 
Security.  The risks include ineffective preparation for TAD outbreaks,95
Failure to share lessons learned from exercises and actual events affect preparedness 
efforts.  Exercises and real events do not generally involve the U.S states at one time, thus the 
information gained from them is not always available throughout the U.S.  The lessons learned 
from TAD outbreak exercises and actual events provide insight on the measures needed to 
improve TAD preparedness and response efforts.  Planners who have access to these lessons can 
use them to improve their plans; those who do not cannot.
 increased spread of 
disease, ineffective response efforts, and inadequate availability of resources.  Disconnects 
relating to the decision regarding the responsibility, method, timing, and information to be shared 
also affect the communication network.  Communication networks have limited functionality 
when these decisions are not finalized.  The decisions about timing, method, content, and 
responsibility of communications affect public reactions and market stability domestically and 
abroad.  Information sharing outside TAD outbreaks is also important for preparedness efforts.   
96
                                                 
95 Ibid. Pg. 183. 
  These disconnects regarding failure 
to share lessons learned can weaken preparedness and response plans throughout the U.S. 
96 As an example, Kansas and Oklahoma produce a set of lessons learned from a simulation exercise, and share them 
between themselves but not their neighboring states Missouri, Nebraska, and Arkansas.  The TAD preparedness and 
response plans of Oklahoma and Kansas have the potential to improve from the lessons learned.  The TAD 
preparedness and response plans of Missouri, Nebraska, and Arkansas do not have the same potential for 
improvement since Kansas and Oklahoma did not share the lessons learned from their exercise. 
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 A federal declaration of emergency provides resources to state and state governments in 
need of supplemental assistance.97
These remaining three disconnects affect the communication process in all of the areas 
discussed in the previous paragraphs.  Food and Agriculture Security is positively affected by 
effective communication; it improves the ability of state and state governments to coordinate 
with one another in a secure and timely manner.  Preparing for and responding to a TAD 
outbreak requires good communication.  Bureaucratic interference, personal and professional 
relationship challenges, personality clashes, and language and cultural differences can all inhibit 
communication.  Numerous government agencies, on both the state and federal levels, are 
involved in TAD outbreaks.  All of these agencies must communicate with each other for 
coordinated and timely response efforts to occur.  Interference between governmental agencies 
disrupts this needed communication.  Good personal and professional relationships also help 
reduce the potential for bureaucratic interference.   
   Three disconnects in the domain of communication relate to 
the process of applying for and receiving a federal declaration of emergency.  Accurate 
communication of the information required to meet the qualifications is vital in attaining these 
resources.  In the case of TAD outbreak emergencies, this is critical because TADs are not 
specifically addressed in the Stafford Act.  These disconnects relating to acquiring a federal 
declaration of emergency can affect the availability of resources needed in a state or state TAD 
outbreak response.  Ineffective response can lead to further spread of the disease and disrupt 
Food and Agriculture Security.  A declaration of an emergency also affects the communication 
network itself; prior to a declaration, the exchange of information between state governments and 
the federal government may be limited.   
                                                 
97 FEMA, "Declaration Process Fact Sheet." 
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The ability of TAD responders to communicate through the barriers that language and 
culture may present is important.  Personnel who are multilingual and have an understanding of 
how cultural differences affect perceptions of communication are a critical resource.  Lacking the 
communication ability that these personnel provide may lead to misunderstandings with farmers, 
stakeholders, and the general public.  
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Chapter 3: Disconnect Analysis of the Domain of Knowledge 
Introduction 
The domain of knowledge is essential to the success of TAD response and preparedness 
plans.  A state, region, or community may have a written plan in place at the time of a TAD 
outbreak, but if personnel involved in the outbreak are not knowledgeable of its contents, it is not 
useful.  The officials involved in developing and amending the plans must also be 
knowledgeable of the current practices, techniques, and standards concerning TAD diagnosis and 
control.  This knowledge is attained through communication efforts between officials and TAD 
preparedness and response plan rehearsals. 
The general public should also have knowledge of TAD preparedness and response 
efforts.  Officials can help ease tension and prevent panic by providing the public with 
information about the importance of and reasoning behind actions taken during a TAD outbreak.  
Animal health officials, extension services personnel, private consultants, and state veterinarians 
are all resources for this knowledge.  Information should be provided as openly and accurately as 
possible to maintain trust among those affected by the TAD outbreak.  
Information concerning the organizations and industries involved in TAD outbreak 
preparedness and response is also vital.  Each individual and organization must understand their 
role and responsibility when preparing for and responding to a TAD outbreak.  This knowledge 
enhances the communication and resourcing abilities of the responders.  Responders who do not 
understand their roles and responsibilities hinder response efforts.  TAD outbreak preparedness 
and response efforts are more likely to be successful when those involved have information 
about their colleagues.  This awareness of each other’s abilities, training, techniques, and access 
to resources allows for a more rapid and efficient effort. 
38 
 
 
This chapter outlines the disconnects within the domain of knowledge, featuring insights 
gained from the TAD preparedness and response literature, interviews with experts, and direct 
observations. 
Analysis 
 Samples must be safely and swiftly transported from suspect/infected premises to 
laboratories.  This can only occur if field personnel have knowledge of appropriate packaging 
methods and available transport services.  Simulation exercise AARs illustrate that many field 
personnel are unaware of the transport services available through the National Veterinary 
Stockpile.98  This lack of ready information delays the transportation of high-priority samples to 
the appropriate laboratories.99
 TAD preparedness and response plans involve surveillance programs before, during, and 
after outbreaks.  These programs include information regarding the acceptable types of samples 
needed for laboratory tests and the number of animals needed for adequate sample collection.  
This information can change over time, and therefore may result in disconnects.  One disconnect 
occurs when state and state plans are not kept abreast of the procedures that have been adopted 
by the federal government as the most accurate and efficient.
 
100
                                                 
98 The National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) is a resource for the states during a TAD outbreak.  It provides 
resources including supplies, equipment, field tests, vaccines, and support services.  Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 9 established the NVS in 2004.  USDA APHIS Veterinary Services, "National Veterinary Stockpile 
Science-Based Logistics Improving Disease Response." 
  Being trained in appropriate 
sampling procedures is as important as having knowledge of what needs to be collected from the 
animals for samples.  
99 Silverman and Speers, ""A Wing and a Prayer" Summary and Analysis of the NAHLN HPAI Exercise Program." 
Pg. 16. 
100 Ibid. Pg. 20.  Protocols should contain information on what samples are appropriate to be sent to the lab, 
information on who to contact concerning number of samples to be send and when, and the sampling frequency.  
Inappropriate information may result in samples overwhelming laboratories in quantity for processing and disposal. 
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 Clear definitions of technical and policy terminology are also important, and knowledge 
of markets, populations, and livestock values are vital in making the definitions clear.  For 
example, the federal indemnity program reimburses farmers for animals lost based on their “fair 
market value.” 101   However, the definition of fair market value is unclear in the program.102
 An individual’s knowledge of his or her specific roles, responsibilities, and procedural 
training plays an integral role in TAD preparedness and response efforts.  It may also be 
necessary for individuals across different fields to understand each other’s roles.  A potential 
knowledge disconnect arises when federal and state officials are not fully informed about the 
tasks they are expected to perform.  This disconnect could lead to suboptimal performance of 
tasks that are key to effective response efforts.
  A 
disconnect can occur when state industry members, farmers, and other stakeholders disagree with 
the federal government on “fair market value” for indemnity payments. 
103
 Many federal, state and state agencies are involved in TAD preparedness and response 
efforts.  Each agency has its own chain of command, and there are also chains of command 
between the agencies.  Knowledge of and respect for the positions of each agency in the chain of 
command is important to all TAD outbreak responders.  Disconnects arise when officials within 
the various levels of government do not understand one another’s leadership roles in the chain of 
command.
 
104
Access to information regarding TAD outbreak preparedness and response is important.  
The existence of the plans themselves is important, but if they are not accessible to those who 
  This knowledge disconnect can also lead to communication disconnects. 
                                                 
101 “USDA bases the Livestock Indemnity Program (LIP) national payment rate for eligible livestock owners on 75 
percent of the average fair market value of the livestock.”  USDA Farm Service Agency, "Fact Sheet Livestock 
Indemnity Program (LIP)," (2009). 
102 Ekboir, Potential Impact of Foot-and-Mouth Disease in California: The Role and Contribution of Animal Health 
Surveillance and Monitoring Services. Pg. 46. 
103 Analytic Services Inc., "High Plains Guardian: Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA)." Pgs. 20-21. 
104 APHIS-FSIS, ""Birds of a Feather" APHIS-FSIS H5N1 Avian Influenza Outbreak Exercise," (APHIS-FSIS, 
2006). Pg. 5. 
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need the information, they are not optimally effective.  Information pertaining to why certain 
measures are taken is also useful.  A USDA/FSIS official—remarking on what could be 
considered a knowledge-related disconnect regarding outbreak preparedness and response 
plans—noted that some farmers and ranchers do not have access to some technologies.  Much of 
the information about to outbreak preparedness and response efforts is only available through the 
use of technology.  Providing these farmers with paper copies may be the only way to share 
information with them.105  This can be considered a disconnect for federal and state responders. 
If state authorities provide information via only the internet or television news networks, they 
may not reach all of their intended audiences.  Lack of knowledge regarding public needs is the 
source of this disconnect. This also extends to the needs of animal health officials.  A plan may 
be easy to access prior to an outbreak, but during an outbreak, when state and federal animal 
health officials are in the field, access may become more difficult.  Both state and federal 
government officials should have access to the state TAD plan whenever they are in need of it.106
Knowledge of state and federal regulations is an important part of TAD preparedness and 
response plans.  Plans for carcass disposal, biosecurity, and quarantine may all be affected by 
state, state, or federal regulations.   Understanding which level of government is responsible for 
setting these regulations is also essential.  Disconnects can occur if TAD preparedness and 
response plans do not take these regulations into account.
  
107
                                                 
105 Don Kautter, "NCFPD 2010 Biennial Meeting," in Partner Perspectives on the Future Defense, Security, and 
Safety of the Food System (2010). 
  Poor understanding of regulations 
106 "NAHLN FMD Table Top Exercise in Topeka Kansas."  Author attending this simulation exercise in May 2010. 
107 Interview with Dr. Barry Erlick Animal Health and Homeland Security Expert.  In the author’s interview with 
Dr. Erlick, he noted that if a TAD response plan had a carcass disposal strategy in place that did not coincide with 
EPA regulations, a disconnect could occur.  The question of who has the authority to make the regulations further 
complicates this issue.  This authority could also change depending on the nature of the TAD disease—zoonotic 
versus not zoonotic. 
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unique to other states or countries can be another source of knowledge disconnects.  This is 
important for surveillance, quarantine, carcass disposal, regionalization,108
 Regionalization itself may be a source of disconnects.  Knowledge of the regionalization 
process, who controls it, and who will assist with it is vital.  Confusion may arise between state 
and federal levels of government regarding the qualifications needed for an area to be declared 
“disease-free,” who has the power to make such a declaration, and how that declaration is then 
validated.
 and resource sharing. 
109
 Knowledge and respect of the chain of command are essential in any emergency.  The 
chain of command may, and likely will, change over the course of a TAD outbreak.  Local 
(town, county, or region), state, and federal responders must work together under one set of 
objectives.  Overall authority must be established from the top down.  Disconnects occur when 
TAD responders are unclear as to which agency or level of government has overall authority.
  This is especially important for a TAD outbreak impacting multiple states.  
Unaffected states may want to reestablish trade, and the process of regionalization is a way to 
accomplish that. 
110
                                                 
108 Regionalization/Zoning: The OIE defines regionalization/zoning as “procedures defining subpopulations of a 
distinct health status within a territory for the purpose of disease control and/ international trade defined primarily on 
a geographical basis.”  OIE, "Terrestrial Animal Health Code Chapter 4.3 Zoning and Compartmentalisation," OIE, 
http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/mcode/en_chapitre_1.4.3.htm. Accessed November 2010. 
  
This disconnect can affect all levels of the chain of command, from the leader of overall agency 
operations to the leader of a specific task.  
109 Interview with Dr. Barry Erlick Animal Health and Homeland Security Expert.  Dr. Erlick also mentioned issues 
relating to how the countries bordering the U.S. will be willing or able to assist with the regionalization process.   
110 Ibid.  Dr. Erlick stressed the importance of establishing roles and responsibilities among the federal agencies.  He 
noted that there needed to be more clear definition of the roles and responsibilities of the involved agencies, and that 
they needed to work together.  If this did not occur, then command structure would start to fall apart at the 
intermediate level.  Interview with Dr. David F. Vogt Kansas Area Veterinarian in Charge , Interview with Sandy 
Johnson Kansas Department of Agriculture Homeland Security Specialist.  Other interview subjects also reiterated 
the important of having knowledge of the chain of command.   
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 Regular changes in personnel can lead to a knowledge disconnect regarding roles and 
responsibilities.111
Individuals who are unaware that they even have roles and responsibilities in the event of 
a TAD outbreak are also potential sources of disconnect.  TAD outbreak preparedness and 
response planning should involve all parties that have the potential to play a role, and failure to 
involve all parties may have negative effects during the outbreak.  State organizations such as 
banks and small business organizations should be included in state and federal planning 
efforts.
  Frequent personnel changes lead to confusion in the chain of command.  
State and federal personnel interact regularly during a TAD outbreak, and if they do not have 
adequate knowledge of their roles and responsibilities, response efforts may be affected.  It is 
vital for both federal and state personnel to be knowledgeable not only of their roles and 
responsibilities but those of their colleagues.   
112
 It is important for accurate and precise information to be provided in TAD outbreak and 
response plans.  There is a potential for a disconnect when state plans provide inadequate 
information regarding federal requirements.  If the plan is unclear, then the knowledge that the 
plan provides is ineffective.
 
113  This disconnect may be further complicated by a state’s 
expectations that responders will have knowledge of federal guidelines and regulations.  This is a 
potential knowledge gap, since state and state TAD outbreak responders may have knowledge of 
state guidelines and regulations, but not of federal ones.114
                                                 
111 Interview with Dr. Barry Erlick Animal Health and Homeland Security Expert. 
 
112 Interview with Dr. David F. Vogt Kansas Area Veterinarian in Charge  
113 Interview with Sandy Johnson Kansas Department of Agriculture Homeland Security Specialist.  Mrs. Johnson 
noted that a potential source of confusion in a TAD outbreak response plan may come from the information 
documented about the quarantine zones.  She has observed the quarantine circle documented as 6 miles, when the 
OIE actually requires them to be 6.2 miles (10km).  If the only source of this information a responder can access is 
the inaccurately documented quarantine circle, then the responder’s knowledge is inaccurate. 
114 Ibid. 
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 The Incident Command System (ICS) is a well-established system for incident response.  
Federal emergency management officials are required to have knowledge of ICS.  There is a 
knowledge disconnect if state emergency management officials do not have the same knowledge 
of ICS.115
 Not all aspects of TAD preparedness and response plans are written down in a document.  
Oral agreements and understandings between states themselves or between state and federal 
officials are also part of TAD preparedness and response.  These oral agreements may be a 
source of disconnect.  A change in leadership or personnel may affect these agreements, 
especially when these agreements are brought up during a TAD outbreak and the leaders are 
unaware of the agreements to which their predecessor committed.  This lack of knowledge may 
have a negative impact on response efforts.
  Federal government officials will use ICS when they become involved in a TAD 
outbreak.  If state government officials are not knowledgeable of this system, the effectiveness of 
the outbreak response efforts will decrease. Federal and state emergency responders need to train 
and exercise their knowledge of ICS together. 
116
 Both federal and state emergency response personnel have to know how to respond to 
natural disasters and manmade disasters, but there may be a knowledge gap for animal disease 
outbreak emergencies.  Understanding the dynamic nature of animal disease outbreaks is 
important for emergency responders.  A disconnect can occur between state and federal 
emergency responders when there are different expectations regarding each other’s 
understanding of animal disease outbreaks. If one group has knowledge and the other does not, 
response efforts may be hindered.
 
117
                                                 
115 Ibid. 
 
116 Ibid. 
117 Interview with Dr. David F. Vogt Kansas Area Veterinarian in Charge  
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Conclusions 
 The table below, which lists the knowledge disconnects that emerged through literature 
review, direct observations, and personal interviews, will be followed by a discussion of the 
disconnects and their significance to Food and Agriculture Security. 
Table 4 Disconnects in the Domain of Knowledge 
Disconnects 
Failure to know all transportation possibilities for 
diagnostic samples 
Failure to know the roles and responsibilities of other 
responders 
Failure to know the chain of command 
Failure to know the appropriate outlets for information 
sharing 
Inability to access information about TAD* outbreak 
preparedness and response plans 
Failure to know regulations about quarantine, carcass 
disposal, and decontamination 
Failure to understand the process of regionalization 
Failure to provide information regarding roles and 
responsibilities to all groups that have them during a 
TAD* outbreak 
Failure to understand  the use of the Incident Command 
System 
Misunderstandings concerning oral agreements versus 
documented agreements 
Failure to understand animal disease response methods 
and expectations 
*TAD: Transboundary Animal Disease 
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 TAD outbreaks constitute an agricultural emergency.  These incidents must be handled 
promptly and in a coordinated manner.118 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 calls for 
DHS to coordinate a National Response Plan (NRP), which summarizes the roles and 
responsibilities of responders.  The directive also instructs states to adopt the NRP and to 
develop state level plans to protect agriculture.  These plans should be developed to manage 
domestic incidents, including TAD outbreaks.119
                                                 
118 Myers, "Agriculture and Food Defense." Pg. 185. 
  Disconnects that relate to knowledge of roles 
and responsibilities, including an individual’s knowledge of their own roles and responsibilities 
as well those of other responders and officials, can lead to confusion among responders and slow 
response efforts.  Understanding roles and responsibilities also requires understanding the chain 
of command.  Coordinated handling of TAD outbreaks requires responders to not only 
understand roles and responsibilities, but also whom they should report to.  This knowledge also 
affects the security of information exchange.  Disconnects regarding the understanding and use 
of ICS also directly affect the coordination and promptness of response efforts.  Inconsistent use 
of the ICS between affected states, communities, and organizations can result in ineffective use 
of resources, ineffective communication, and ineffective planning.  Verbal, non-documented 
personal agreements between responders and animal health officials are also involved in the 
coordination of TAD preparedness and response efforts.  Confusion regarding these agreements 
can affect the organization of resources and communication.  A final disconnect that has the 
potential to affect TAD preparedness and response effort coordination involves knowledge of 
regulations.  When there is not a consistent understanding of the regulations for quarantine, 
carcass disposal, and decontaminations, coordination deteriorates.  All of these steps must be 
119 Ibid. Pg. 181.  In 2008, the National Response Framework (NRF) replaced the NRP.  Department of Homeland 
Security, "National Response Framework,"  http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/editorial_0566.shtm.  Accessed 
December 6, 2010. 
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completed in a prompt and coordinated fashion to in order prevent the spread of the TAD and 
control the outbreak.   
 Knowledge of TAD preparedness and response plans and methods are important to 
preventing and controlling disease outbreaks.  For coordinated and prompt response efforts 
occur, preparedness plans need to be able to be quickly, safely, and successfully put into 
action.120  Two disconnects that have emerged involve knowledge of these plans.  These involve 
actual knowledge of the content of the plan accessibility of this knowledge.  This extends to the 
knowledge of how to respond to animal disease emergencies as opposed to other types of 
emergencies.  TAD outbreak preparedness and response plans cannot effectively prevent and 
control TADs unless responders can access and understand them.  It is also important for 
emergency responders who do not handle animal disease outbreaks on a regular basis to 
understand how the plan may be different from other emergency plans.  Emergency response 
teams handle responses to natural disasters more often than disease outbreaks.  TAD outbreaks 
are, in some ways, more dynamic than natural disasters, as disease outbreaks change and evolve 
as time progresses while natural disaster situations generally do not change after the initial event 
has occurred.121
 Regionalization is a method used to open trade from regions, or zones, that have been 
confirmed to be disease-free.  In the event of a TAD outbreak, quarantine is used to prevent the 
spread of disease.  If quarantine is successful, the disease can be limited to a certain region and 
  Responders to TAD outbreaks must adapt to the situation as it changes.  
Understanding the differences in responding to various types of emergencies is crucial to 
successful responses. 
                                                 
120 Myers, "Agriculture and Food Defense." Pg. 185 
121 Not all natural disaster situations are the same.  If events continue to occur after the initial event, then the 
situation becomes more dynamic.  The course of time in which events will continue to occur in natural disaster 
situations is generally still much shorter than that of a TAD outbreak.  Changes in the course, area affected, and 
number of animals affected will continue to change and evolve over a longer period of time.   
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leave others disease-free.  Other countries may later agree to trade with these disease-free 
regions.  An example for use of this process would be the 2002-2003 Exotic Newcastle Disease 
(END) outbreak in the U.S.  The disease occurred in California, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, 
and Nevada, while the remainder of the country was disease-free.122
 The NAHLN was discussed in chapter 2.  Disconnects involving these laboratory 
networks also exist within the domain of knowledge.  When there is a suspected TAD event in 
the U.S., a FADD will collect samples and send them off to a NAHLN laboratory.  A potential 
disconnect occurs in knowledge of the transportation methods needed to safely transfer these 
samples to the laboratory.  Samples must be appropriately packaged so that the samples cannot 
spread the disease that they are potentially carrying to either humans or other animals.  It is also 
important to have access to information about secure and rapid transportation services.  This 
disconnect can lead to delays in samples reaching the laboratories and thus delays in diagnosis.  
It can also lead to lost samples that could potentially be used to further spread the disease, 
  By using regionalization, 
poultry trade could still occur with countries who agreed to import from the disease-free region 
of the U.S.  Regionalization can open trade with disease-free regions before a disease is 
eradicated entirely from an infected region.  It may also be used if a TAD becomes endemic to 
the infected region.  Knowledge of the regionalization process and the requirements is important 
for secure and transparent trading.  Disconnects in knowledge about the regionalization process 
can lead to the trade of potentially diseased animals or animals that are inaccurately certified as 
disease-free.  Understanding who defines and certifies this disease-free status is an important 
aspect of this disconnect.   
                                                 
122 Dr. Kati Steneroden, Dr. Anna Rovid Spickler, and Dr. Radfor Davis, "Newcastle Disease," (Ames: The Center 
for Food Security & Public Health Iowa State University, 2004).Pg. 2 Slide 10. 
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particularly if such samples fell into the hands of an individual seeking to harm the food and 
agriculture industry. 
 The final disconnect in the domain of knowledge involves the domain of communication.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, it is important for communication networks to establish 
what information is to be released, who will release it, when it will be released, and how it will 
be released.  Knowledge of appropriate outlets for information sharing is part of understanding 
how information will be released.  Each individual that may have a role in a TAD outbreak may 
not have the same access to information.  Today, the internet is a common outlet for information 
sharing, but not all individuals have access to technology to connect to the internet.  Other 
individuals may rely solely on the internet, so having only print copies of information will not 
benefit them.  This disconnect in the understanding of which information outlets can and should 
be used can affect any of the other disconnects mentioned in this chapter.  All of these 
disconnects rely on access to the information, and if the outlet used is not accessible to the 
individual that needs the information, they will not have all the knowledge that they may need. 
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Chapter 4: Disconnect Analysis of the Domain of Resourcing 
Introduction 
 The domain of resourcing relates to the tools that are necessary to prepare for and 
respond to a TAD outbreak.  This includes, but is not limited to, equipment, personnel, facilities, 
time, and finances.  The success of preparedness and response efforts relies on quick and reliable 
access to these resources.  Many prior agreements, policies, and plans are required for these 
resources to be available.  Arrangements may be needed with industry, stakeholders, animal 
disease control centers, national equipment stockpiles, and other countries to provide resources.  
It is not uncommon for resources to be used up through TAD outbreak response efforts, even 
with considerable prior planning. 
 Organizing financial plans and resourcing agreements should be part of TAD outbreak 
preparedness.  Understanding the availability of resources and finances prior to an outbreak is 
essential.  Financial plans and policies that are in place prior to a TAD outbreak prevent the 
unnecessary confusion and disorganization that occurs when the funding for operation of 
preparedness and response efforts starts to diminish.  Without access to resources outside the 
state or country, responders quickly exhaust existing resources early in response and surveillance 
efforts.  Agreements with other countries and organizations should exist to help provide 
resources when the U.S. supply diminishes. 
Resources are most heavily used in the response phase of a TAD outbreak, but are also 
necessary in the preparedness phase.  Surveillance programs, for example, use numerous 
resources to prepare for and monitor a TAD outbreak.  Successful surveillance requires access to 
personnel, testing supplies, laboratories, and time.  Establishing adequate and efficient 
surveillance programs is vital to successful TAD outbreak preparedness.  Surveillance programs 
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should not use more resources than are necessary, as the same resources will also be needed for 
response efforts. 
Analysis 
TAD outbreaks present difficulties for laboratories in resource availability and financing.  
Several AARs from actual events and simulated outbreaks have highlighted this problem.  
Regulatory constraints limit the amount of testing and operational supplies laboratories can 
acquire or have on hand at a given time.  Initial response efforts rapidly consume laboratory 
testing supplies.  Lag time between the accumulation of cases and the declaration of a state of 
emergency may be a source of a disconnect.  A declaration of a federal emergency can ease 
financial constraints at the state level.123
Laboratories must have resources (e.g., personnel, supplies, and equipment) accessible in 
inventory when TADs occur.  AARs from a recent series of exercises simulating an HPAI 
outbreak noted that, at the time the exercises were occurring, there was not a system of national 
standards in place for animal health laboratory resources.
   
124
A resourcing disconnect identified through TAD exercises relates to the availability of 
facilities for cattle that were in-transit when a stop movement order was issued.  One report from 
an exercise in the Texas panhandle states that up to 10,000 cattle trucks could be in transit on any 
  This lack of national standards is a 
source of potential disconnect.  The finance and resource planning process of TAD preparedness 
and response is complicated by this lack of federally established standards.  Response efforts can 
be hindered when state and state laboratories do not possess adequate resources and finances due 
to inappropriate planning.  
                                                 
123 Silverman and Speers, ""A Wing and a Prayer" Summary and Analysis of the NAHLN HPAI Exercise Program." 
Pg. 39. 
124 Ibid. Pg. 22. 
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day.125
The availability of finances during an outbreak is another area where disconnects can 
occur.  It is important for farmers, ranchers, and feedlot managers to receive indemnity for 
animals lost through disease control and eradication efforts.  The federal and state governments 
currently only pay indemnity for animals that are destroyed during TAD control and eradication 
efforts.  Animals that die of the disease prior to being destroyed are not covered by indemnity.
  National and state TAD response plans call for stop movement when TADs, such as 
FMD, are suspected.  Local authorities are responsible for housing these animals until they are 
cleared for movement.  The disconnect can occur when local authorities do not have pre-
arranged lists of available facilities and equipment to manage them. 
126  
This is a potential disconnect when TADs such as Rinderpest occur.127
The U.S. has not experienced an outbreak of FMD since the early 1900’s.  Events during 
an outbreak in 1914-1915 illustrate a financial disconnect.  At a hearing in the U.S. House of 
Representatives, the state of Illinois addressed concerns about the amount of financial 
responsibility the state should have in controlling its FMD outbreak.  The federal government’s 
role in the quarantine and eradication of the disease, as well as the financial burden of those 
measures, was a concern for the state.
 
128
                                                 
125 Jim Amend, Suzanne Burnham, and Ken Waldrup, "The Panhandle Exercise," (Amarillo2003). Pg. 15 
  Differing views about the financial responsibilities held 
by each level of government can present a disconnect.     
126 “The “Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008” authorized the Livestock Indemnity Program (LIP) to 
provide benefits to livestock producers for livestock deaths in excess of normal mortality caused by adverse weather 
that occurred on or after Jan. 1, 2009, and before Oct 1, 2011, including losses because of hurricanes, floods, 
blizzards, diseases, wildfires, extreme heat, and extreme cold.”  USDA Farm Service Agency, "Fact Sheet Livestock 
Indemnity Program (LIP)." 
127 Amend, Burnham, and Waldrup, "The Panhandle Exercise." Pg. 29.  Rinderpest causes a high level of mortality 
in cattle.  Rinderpest and FMD may result in the same total number of animals lost, but Rinderpest, as a disease, will 
kill more animals than FMD.  Since the LIP does not cover animals that die of the disease, the farmer may receive 
less indemnity if Rinderpest was the infectious disease present as opposed to FMD. 
128 Committee on Claims, To Reimburse the State of Illinois, First Session, May 13 1916. Pg. 4. 
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Indemnity is also linked with emergency declarations.  Federal funding for indemnity 
becomes available after a disease is confirmed and an emergency is declared.  Without the 
promise of these funds, cooperation between farmers and animal health officials may be 
compromised.129
The military is an important resource that can be used for TAD response efforts.  They 
can provide personnel to support field operations such as stop movement, boarder control, and 
carcass disposal.  A disconnect can occur when the state and state plans do not appropriately 
describe the roles of military personnel and resources.  Agreements between state officials and 
military groups, such as state National Guard units, that are not made prior to TAD outbreaks 
may lead to inadequate availability of necessary resources. 
  State officials need full cooperation between these groups for early TAD 
response efforts to be successful.  A lack of full cooperation may occur due to limited security in 
the guarantee of indemnity funds.  Reimbursement for losses is a major source of strife—and 
represents a potential disconnect—between local (community, county, and region), state, and 
federal officials during TAD preparedness and response efforts. 
130
Another disconnect can occur regarding the availability of the military as a resource.  The 
military plays a number of roles in the U.S., some of which may conflict with the roles expected 
of them during TAD outbreaks.  Many military personnel are often deployed overseas for 
national campaigns.
   Prior discussions and agreements 
between states and the military provide descriptions of the roles the military is capable of and 
expected to fill. 
131
                                                 
129 Analytic Services Inc., "High Plains Guardian: Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA)." Pg. 16. 
  This can lead to a disconnect if the state and state TAD outbreak 
response plans expect military personnel and equipment to be an available resource, but due to 
States have concerns similar to those of the federal government regarding the release of funds for indemnity. 
130 Ibid. Pg. V.  This article also suggests agreements with the USDA and Department of Defense regarding the role 
their personnel in TAD outbreak response efforts. 
131 Ibid. Pg. 15. 
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deployment, they become partly or completely unavailable.  The use of the military as a resource 
can cause disconnects as a result of both lack of availability and inefficient use when they are 
available. 
There are various types of emergency declarations, each of which provides new levels of 
resources to TAD outbreak response efforts.  Emergency declarations are often intimately tied to 
the process of disease confirmation.  A resourcing disconnect can occur when either the state or 
federal government delay declaring a federal emergency while disease confirmation is pending. 
Contributing to this disconnect are the recommendations of federal officials for the state and 
local officials to provide unrelenting rapid response efforts for disease control.132
 Finances are a major source of disconnect during TAD outbreaks.  Questions arise in an 
outbreak relating to the responsibilities for financing early response efforts—prior to declaration 
of an emergency or disaster.  Both the state and federal levels of government have a 
responsibility in providing finances.  Disconnect occurs when the understanding between these 
levels of government is unclear regarding where the responsibilities lie.
  Resources are 
required during this time of uncertainty between discovery of initial cases and confirmation of 
the disease as required for the declaration of emergency.  Inadequate agreements between state 
and federal officials regarding resource availability for early response efforts contribute to this 
disconnect. 
133
 Laboratories will have a significant role to play in a TAD outbreak.  They will handle the 
influx of samples to be tested for initial disease confirmation, and later, for the continued 
presence of the disease.  Numerous testing supplies and personnel are needed for these tests to be 
handled.  A resourcing disconnect may occur if the laboratories are not kept up-to-date on the 
 
                                                 
132 Ibid. Pg. 15. 
133 "NAHLN FMD Table Top Exercise in Topeka Kansas." 
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expectations held by the state and federal governments—possibly leading to the use of 
inappropriate testing methods, inadequate availability of testing supplies, and personnel.134
 Each state has a different resourcing capability for TAD preparedness and response.  
These differences in capabilities may be a source of a disconnect.  Some states may be better 
prepared to handle a TAD outbreak than others.  Resourcing is a major aspect of preparation.    
States rely on the federal government to supply resources like vaccines, decontamination 
equipment, and finances, with some states more reliant on the federal government than others.  
Disconnects can occur when prior agreements are not made to coordinate efforts for obtaining 
and distributing these resources.  Questions may also arise as to who should be responsible for 
providing and obtaining these resources.  They arise due to factors such as the origin of the 
outbreak—for example, whether the infection was intentional or accidental—and spread from 
state to state.  These two issues lead to disconnects among the states themselves and between the 
state and federal government. 
 
135
 When a TAD outbreak occurs state governments often expect certain resources to be 
available from either their neighboring states or the federal government.  An example of a 
resource that some states may expect to have access to is the National Veterinary Stockpile 
(NVS).  The NVS provides resources to states that need to respond to TAD outbreaks.  States 
with agreements with the NVS will expect to have NVS resources available to them.
 
136
                                                 
134 Ibid. 
  These 
expectations can lead to a disconnect.  The expectations may not always be shared by the 
135 Interview with Dr. Barry Erlick Animal Health and Homeland Security Expert. Dr. Erlick also noted that 
resources, other than those needed to respond to the outbreak, may be a challenge for states to acquire.  Quarantine 
will affect the ability of resources to be transported to the affected area.  Supply chains may become backed-up with 
the slow of the economy caused by the outbreak.  Interview with Sandy Johnson Kansas Department of Agriculture 
Homeland Security Specialist.  Mrs. Johnson also commented on this potential disconnect.  She noted that each state 
had different groupings of agencies, and therefore different resourcing methods.  She also noted that within the 
federal government there was a potential disconnect in resourcing responsibilities. 
136USDA APHIS Veterinary Services, "National Veterinary Stockpile Science-Based Logistics Improving Disease 
Response." 
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potential source. It is also possible that the resources that are needed are already in use 
somewhere else.  In the case of TAD outbreaks, it is possible for several states to be affected by 
the disease.  States that are affected first receive the first rounds of resources from the federal 
government.  As the disease progresses, more states may become affected and they further 
deplete resources.  The states that become involved late in the outbreak expect to receive the 
same resources as the states initially involved.  This is where the disconnect can occur.137
 Personnel availability is a large resourcing aspect of TAD outbreak preparedness and 
response efforts.  Financial constraints may affect the availability of both state and federal 
personnel.  When decreased numbers of available personnel are available, each available 
responder must take on more roles.  A resourcing disconnect may occur if states expect to have 
full access to certain federal personnel, but they do not since fewer are available and will have to 
be shared with other states.
  
138
 Indemnity for lost animals in a TAD outbreak is a major source of potential disconnect.  
However, animal loss is not the only income compensation that farmers need.  Indemnity for 
down time and loss of business at the affected premises are also disconnects.  The federal 
government covers indemnity for animal loss, but it does not compensate farmers for loss of 
business while their farm is quarantined, depopulated, and decontaminated.   This disconnect 
 
                                                 
137 Interview with Craig Beardsley NABC Project Administrator.  Mr. Beardsley also noted that the expectations of 
resource sharing between states may also be considered a disconnect.   States may share resources during an 
outbreak in an effort to control the outbreak, and prevent its spread.  States that are not affected may not want to 
share their resources once a neighboring state becomes infected.  This may be due to a factor such as keeping the 
resources within their own state in case they become infected.  They may also have the resources that are expected 
to be shared already in use elsewhere.   
138 Interview with Sandy Johnson Kansas Department of Agriculture Homeland Security Specialist, Interview with 
Dr. William Brown Kansas Livestock Commissioner, Interview with Dr. David F. Vogt Kansas Area Veterinarian in 
Charge   Each of these officials commented on the fact that the current economy my affect the number of 
government positions at both the state and federal level.  This decreased number of positions would result in more 
responsibility for the personnel that remain.  This increased responsibility may result in a loss of close relationships 
between officials. 
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relates to who, if anyone, is responsible for compensating farmers for this lost time.139  Insurance 
policies covering loss of business may be necessary to compensate farmers when the government 
cannot.140
Conclusions 
 
 The table below, which lists the knowledge disconnects that emerged through literature 
review, direct observations, and personal interviews, will be followed by a discussion of the 
disconnects and their significance in Food and Agriculture Security. 
Table 5 Disconnects in the Domain of Resourcing 
Disconnects 
Lack of resources prior to a declaration of federal 
emergency 
Lack of national resourcing standards for 
laboratories 
Lack of lists of available facilities and resources 
to manage them 
Confusion regarding indemnity for animal loss 
due to depopulation versus disease 
Confusion regarding financial responsibility for 
TAD* response efforts 
Confusion regarding the responsibility for 
indemnity prior to a federal declaration of 
emergency 
Poor understanding of the use of the military as a 
resource 
Lack of availability of the military as a resource 
Lack of resource availability prior to a federal 
declaration of emergency 
Failure to keep laboratories up-to-date on testing 
                                                 
139 Interview with Dr. David F. Vogt Kansas Area Veterinarian in Charge   Dr. Vogt also commented on the 
disconnect caused by the unclear definition of “fair-market-value” in relation to indemnity for animal loss.   
140 Agribusiness insurance policies may cover personal and business loss due to interruption of business (such as 
TAD outbreak control).  Allen Financial Insurance Group, "Agribusiness Farm & Ranch Policy,"  
http://www.eqgroup.com/agribusiness.htm.  Accessed December 7, 2010. 
57 
 
requirements 
Confusion regarding individual state capabilities 
Inconsistent expectations of individual states of 
support from other states 
Failure to understand the relationship between 
finances and personnel availability 
Confusion regarding indemnity for loss of 
business 
*TAD: Transboundary Animal Disease 
 Indemnity is a major source of resourcing disconnects.  Over the course of a TAD 
outbreak, questions arise concerning indemnity for animals lost due to depopulation versus those 
that are lost to death from the disease and indemnity for loss of business.  These questions 
involve whether indemnity will be paid at all, who is responsible for paying it, and when it will 
be paid.  The prospect of indemnity payments affect farmers’ willingness to participate in disease 
control efforts.  It may be harder to get the cooperation of a farmer who is not guaranteed the 
promise of compensation for his or her lost animals and business.  There is also potential for 
further spread of disease, like in the Taiwan FMD outbreak, through farmers introducing the 
disease to their farm in order to receive indemnity.  While both of these may be extreme cases, 
they have the potential to affect the ability of responders and animal health officials to rapidly 
control and eradicate a TAD outbreak. 
 The NAHLN also has disconnects in the domain of resourcing.  When a TAD outbreak 
occurs, the NAHLN, as a network of laboratories, provides a system of facilities, supplies, and 
personnel that can be accessed throughout the U.S.  NAHLN laboratories will be responsible for 
testing samples that the state FADDs send them.  They will perform the tests to either positively 
or negatively confirm presence of the disease they are certified to handle.  Large numbers of 
samples will be tested to continue to track the presence of the disease after it is confirmed, and 
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after it is eradicated to demonstrate freedom from the disease.141
 Federal declarations of emergency have been discussed in the previous chapter regarding 
disconnects in the domain of communication.  This chapter mentioned that communication 
disconnects could lead to a diminished availability of resources.  TAD outbreaks always begin at 
the state level.  When a farmer or state veterinarian notices signs of illness in an animal that lead 
to suspicion of a TAD, he or she notifies the state animal health authorities.  The case is 
investigated at the premises.  Quarantine and biosecurity measures are placed on the premises 
until the disease is either confirmed or denied.  If the disease is confirmed, further investigations 
are conducted to ascertain all the contacts of the infected animal.  These contacts are also 
investigated and potentially quarantined.  Further cases of the disease may arise while 
containment efforts continue on the first case and its contacts.  Disease control efforts continue 
until the disease is eradicated.  The state and state governments are responsible for providing the 
necessary resources for this process until the federal government becomes involved.  Various 
resourcing disconnects occur in the time between when a TAD outbreak is first discovered and 
when a federal emergency is declared.  Large numbers of supplies and finances can be used up in 
  The resourcing disconnects in 
the laboratories occur when there is not a national standard for the resources that should be 
immediately available at the time of an outbreak.  Inadequate knowledge of the requirements and 
policy changes made by the federal government also affect the resources available to the 
laboratory.  Each laboratory in the NAHLN is certified to work with different diseases.  This 
complicates resourcing, as each laboratory will need different equipment and supplies to test for 
the diseases for which they have been certified.  Insufficient laboratory resources can lead to 
decreased diagnostic capabilities.   
                                                 
141 USDA APHIS, "About NAHLN,"  http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/nahln/about_nahln.shtml. Accessed 
November 21, 2010. 
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this time period, which is also the reason a federal declaration of emergency is eventually 
needed.  Finances and supplies need to be available prior to arrival of help from the federal 
government.  State and state government officials are on their own for an undefined amount of 
time before the federal government becomes involved.  Financial and resourcing plans need to be 
in place prior to an outbreak, or these resources may run out in the early stages of the 
outbreak.142
 The availability of resources is a central disconnect in the domain of resourcing.  It has 
already emerged in the disconnects involving indemnity and the declaration of emergency.  
Various factors affect the availability of resources including prior planning, finances, and 
capabilities.  Effective TAD outbreak preparedness and response plans include resourcing and 
financial plans.  These plans require knowledge of existing resources and finances, and 
information on where more may be acquired.  Disconnects can arise due to the differences 
between a state government’s capabilities and its expectations.  Each state government has a 
different capability to resource and fiancé a TAD outbreak.  A less capable state may need more 
assistance from neighboring state governments and the federal government.  A state government 
that expects assistance from outside may be inadequately prepared to handle an outbreak when 
  Diminished supplies and finances slow response efforts and provide the opportunity 
for disease to spread.  A disconnect also exists combining both indemnity and the declaration of 
emergency.  Indemnity for animal loss due to depopulation is paid for through the USDA’s LIP.  
The disconnect regards who is financially responsible prior to the involvement of the federal 
government.  Questions arise as to if the state government pays the indemnity and is then 
reimbursed by the federal government, and if this is true, how will the states acquire the finances 
needed to pay the indemnity.  These issues influence the potential cooperation of farmers and 
response efforts to the TAD outbreak. 
                                                 
142 Myers, "Agriculture and Food Defense." Pg. 187. 
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that assistance does not become available when it is needed.  The use of the military is also a 
source of disconnect concerning resource availability.  The military may be a helpful resource 
during a TAD outbreak, but their use is limited, as is their availability.  Inappropriate use of the 
military in TAD outbreak response efforts may add to confusion already in place regarding the 
roles and responsibilities of other responders.  The military is also a resource that has limited 
availability due to the deployment of personnel either inside or outside the U.S.  Financial 
availability disconnects can result in decreased availability of personnel, equipment, and 
supplies.  A final disconnect that relates to resource availability involves listing of available 
facilities and resources necessary to manage them.  Stop movement orders are given to prevent 
the spread of a disease, and holding facilities are needed to accommodate the stopped animals.  A 
state or region issues a stop movement order when a TAD outbreak is suspected either inside or 
outside the area.  Stop movement orders require that all livestock related traffic be stopped and 
screened.143  The animals on these vehicles need a place to be unloaded and cared for if they are 
not cleared to continue to their final destination.  The animals will then need holding facilities 
until their fates are decided.  These facilities require personnel to take care of the animals and 
food to feed them.  When these facilities, and the resources to manage them, are not available 
there is an increased chance for disease spread and increased strain on the transportation 
system.144
 Financial resources are also a central disconnect.  They play a role in all of the previously 
listed disconnects.  Finances must be available to purchase and support all the resourcing needs 
 
                                                 
143 Sumner County Hazard Mitigation Planning Committee, "Sumner County Emergency Operations Plan," in 
Incident Annex - Foreign Animal Diseases (2010). Pg. 5. 
144 When adequate holding facilities are not available, there is increased traffic backlogged due to the stop 
movement efforts.  The trucks that the animals are being transported in must also have a place to be stored until they 
are cleared to continue or the stop movement order is lifted.  If these trucks cannot move either because they do not 
have a holding facility or the animals in them don’t have one, they can potentially slow traffic. 
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of a TAD outbreak.  Finances are needed for supplies, equipment, personnel payroll, and 
indemnity.  A disconnect specific to finances is financial responsibility.  Understanding who 
holds financial responsibility for each aspect of TAD outbreak preparedness and response efforts 
between the local, state and federal governments is important.  Response efforts are slowed and 
resources are diminished by confusion of financial responsibility.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
Significance of Disconnects in the Domains of Communication, Knowledge, and Resourcing 
on Food and Agriculture Security 
 To review, the research questions to be answered by this thesis are: 
1. Within the U.S., what disconnects exist in the domains of communication, 
knowledge, and resourcing of emergency preparedness and response between the 
different levels of government, from federal to state, in the processes of planning for 
and responding to TAD emergencies? 
2. How do these domain-specific disconnects affect Food and Agriculture Security in 
the U.S.? 
The table below—which lists disconnects in the domains of communication, knowledge, 
and resourcing that emerged through a literature review, direct observations, and personal 
interviews—is followed by discussion of the conclusions reached in the previous chapters and 
their effect on Food and Agriculture Security in the U.S. 
Table 6 Disconnects in all Three Domains of TAD Preparedness and Response 
Communication Knowledge Resourcing 
Failure of laboratories and federal 
agencies to correlate their sample 
identification systems  
Failure to know all transportation 
possibilities for diagnostic samples 
Lack of resources prior to a 
declaration of federal emergency 
Confusion regarding the timing of 
and responsibility for notification 
Failure to know the roles and 
responsibilities of other responders 
Lack of national resourcing 
standards for laboratories 
Inadequate information sharing 
between the state and federal 
government to attain a federal 
declaration of emergency 
Failure to know the chain of 
command 
Lack of lists of available facilities 
and resources to manage them 
Failure of Stafford Act to cover 
TAD* outbreaks  
Failure to know the appropriate 
outlets for information sharing 
Confusion regarding indemnity for 
animal loss due to depopulation 
versus disease 
Lack of established communication Inability to access information about Confusion regarding financial 
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plans between the state and federal 
government 
TAD* outbreak preparedness and 
response plans 
responsibility for TAD* response 
efforts 
Failure to adequately share 
information  prior to federal 
declaration of emergency 
Failure to know regulations about 
quarantine, carcass disposal, and 
decontamination 
Confusion regarding the 
responsibility for indemnity prior to 
a federal declaration of emergency 
Confusion regarding the chain of 
communication for test results 
Failure to understand the process of 
regionalization 
Poor understanding of the use of the 
military as a resource 
Confusion regarding responsibility 
of communication decisions 
Failure to provide information 
regarding roles and responsibilities 
to all groups that have them during a 
TAD* outbreak 
Lack of availability of the military 
as a resource 
Lack of working professional 
relationships, poor personal 
relationships, and  personality 
conflicts  
Failure to understand  the use of the 
Incident Command System 
Lack of resource availability prior to 
a federal declaration of emergency 
Bureaucratic interference Misunderstandings concerning oral 
agreements versus documented 
agreements 
Failure to keep laboratories up-to-
date on testing requirements 
Lack of a single communication 
resource to share plans, regulations, 
and guidelines 
Failure to understand animal disease 
response methods and expectations 
Confusion regarding individual state 
capabilities 
Inability to overcome language and 
cultural barriers 
 Inconsistent expectations of 
individual states of support from 
other states 
Lack  of communication networks 
with industry, stakeholders, and 
civilians 
 Failure to understand the 
relationship between finances and 
personnel availability 
Failure to share lessons learned from 
simulations,  AARs**, and real 
events 
 Confusion regarding indemnity for 
loss of business 
Failure to share information with 
laboratories concerning policy 
changes 
  
*TAD Transboundary Animal Disease 
**AAR After Action Report 
  
The food and agriculture sector is vulnerable to attack by bioterrorists who seek to disrupt 
the U.S. economy and cause unrest and reduced trust in the protection that is provided by the 
U.S. government.  This can be accomplished through the introduction of TADs into areas 
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previously free of these diseases.  Not only do these diseases pose a threat to animals, but 
depending on the disease, they may also pose a threat to humans.145  Food and Agriculture 
Security—a priority research area for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to protect 
critical infrastructure—requires effective collaboration between federal and state levels of 
government.  They must plan, train, and exercise together to effectively secure the food and 
agriculture sectors.  The general public expects the federal and state levels of government to 
swiftly respond to TAD outbreaks with informed decision making and coordinated 
communication and resourcing.146
 Many of the disconnects in a particular domain affect another domain.  Disconnects 
concerning the communication network affect resourcing.  Another example of this would be 
disconnects that concern knowledge of the chain of command affect coordination and security of 
communication.  It is also noteworthy that many of the identified disconnects also occur between 
groups other than the federal and state governments.  While this thesis focuses on disconnects 
between the federal and state levels of government, it is also important to consider what other 
groups may suffer from these disconnects.  These other groups include, but are not limited to, 
regional and county emergency response teams and town and county law enforcement troops.  
Disconnects also emerged in domains outside the three that were researched in this thesis.  While 
the three domains that were chosen have are important in the process of TAD preparedness and 
  Disconnects in the domains of communication, knowledge, 
and resourcing can affect the ability of the federal and state levels of government to respond to 
TAD outbreaks. 
                                                 
145 Myers, "Agriculture and Food Defense." Pg. 175. 
146 Ibid. Pg. 180.  These outbreaks may be either accidentally or intentionally introduced into the U.S.  Regardless of 
the nature of the introduction they must be prepared for and responded to in a prompt and coordinated fashion.  
Security is maintained through the prevention of entry of TADs into the U.S. and control and eradication of them in 
the case that they do enter. 
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response, other domains also have important roles in the process.  Other potentially important 
domains include technology, regulations/laws, and management/organization. 
 Interactions between the NAHLN and the federal government are a source of disconnects 
in all three domains.  The NAHLN must have the ability to safely and rapidly receive samples, 
test them for disease, and communicate the results to federal and state government animal health 
officials.  Confusion concerning disease status, potential spread to humans, and effects on trade 
markets may result from the disconnects decreasing the capability of the laboratories to perform 
their roles in a TAD outbreak.  When the laboratories cannot perform their roles adequately, 
there is potential for further spread of the disease and prolongation of the duration of the 
outbreak.  This compromises Food and Agriculture Security because increased spread of the 
disease may, in the case of zoonotic diseases, affect public safety.  A prolonged outbreak may 
compromise the availability of safe and secure food inside and outside the U.S.     
 The process of declaring a federal emergency is also a source of disconnects in more than 
one domain.  While two domains are affected, ultimately federal declaration of emergency 
disconnects amount to resourcing issues.   Availability of resources to prevent and respond to 
TAD outbreaks is central to securing the food and agriculture sectors.  Unclear understanding of 
the process and end results of a federal declaration of emergency lead to uncoordinated 
resourcing and slowed response efforts, which in turn prolong the time it takes to control and 
eradicate a disease.   
 Disconnects regarding roles and responsibilities along the chain of command cross all 
three domains.  Animal health officials and TAD outbreak responders coordinate and cooperate 
with one another before, during, and after a TAD outbreak.  Diminished knowledge of roles and 
responsibilities leads to disorderly communication along the chain of command and disorganized 
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allocation, dispersal, and use of resources.  Coordination of TAD outbreak preparedness and 
response efforts are negatively impacted by the effects of disorderly communication and 
disorganized resourcing. 
 The remaining disconnects that emerged are specific in which domains and subtopics of 
TAD preparedness and response they affect, but their overall affect of Food and Agriculture 
Security is much more general.  Reoccurring throughout this discussion of the significance of 
these disconnects on Food and Agriculture Security is the need for rapid and coordinated 
response to TAD outbreaks.  Regardless of the specific aspect of TAD preparedness and 
response affected, disconnects ultimately decrease the ability of the federal and state levels of 
government to coordinate and cooperate with one another.  Food and Agriculture Security is 
compromised by this diminished coordination.   
 The disconnects that emerged throughout this thesis need concrete solutions whenever 
possible.  While not all of the disconnects are able to be solved at this time, some have more 
potential to be solved than others.  Many communication disconnects could be solved by 
responders having access to a computerized information sharing network.  Developing a system 
that could link TAD outbreak planners and responders to one another for information sharing 
would help increase communication abilities.  Linking the information sharing systems of the 
NAHLN and the USDA would be an example of this information sharing network.  Increased 
use of resourcing stockpiles such as the NVS would help alleviate some of the disconnects 
relating to resourcing.  Stockpiles, like the NVS, provide resources to states and communities 
before the federal government is either needed or able to provide resourcing support.  
 This thesis explored the domains of TAD emergency preparedness and response in which 
disconnects occurred, and how they could potentially affect Food and Agriculture Security.  
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Further exploration of this subject is needed.  Many of the disconnects that emerged in this thesis 
reoccurred throughout the analysis.  This indicates that, while the disconnects are noted areas for 
concern, they are still in need of answers for how to prevent them.  The author hopes that the 
disconnects that emerged in this thesis will open future research ideas for how to mitigate these 
disconnects and improve collaboration and cooperation between the federal and state levels of 
government in handling TAD emergency outbreaks.  Examples of areas for further study include 
whether other countries suffer from similar disconnects and how they compensate for them, how 
can better collaboration be established between the laboratories and governmental agencies, what 
steps need to be taken to involve all the appropriate groups in TAD preparedness and response 
planning, and have any of the disconnects relating to indemnity actually contributed to lack of 
cooperation between farmers and animal health officials.   
 This thesis builds on concepts relating to Food and Agriculture Security studied by other 
scholars in the Frontier program at Kansas State University.  A concept being studied by these 
scholars is the hazards of potentially contaminated food imports.147
                                                 
147 Edward Nyambok is a scholar in the Frontier program studying aquaculture contaminants and the hazards they 
pose to consumers.  Edward Nyambok, "Edward Nyambok FIX Project,"  http://frontier.k-
state.edu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=62&Itemid=39. Accessed November 2010. 
  Nyambok’s study relates to 
Food and Agriculture Security given that contaminated food imports may have a negative impact 
on the safety of the food consumers purchase.  Disconnects in the domains of TAD preparedness 
and response can affect consumer food safety.  If the disconnects prevent proper preparation for 
a TAD outbreak, a zoonotic TAD could infect the livestock, and thus compromise the safety of 
the food supply.  Prolonged TAD outbreak response efforts also decrease the availability of food 
supply provided by livestock.  Another concept studied is the effect of naturalistic decision-
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making on food safety and food defense.148
 Providing answers and solutions to the disconnects that have emerged throughout this 
thesis may not be easy.  Some of the disconnects arise due to the nature of human behavior itself, 
and cannot be solved by either better planning or through the use of technology.  Human nature 
may prevent some of these disconnects from ever being fully prevented, but this should not 
prevent Food and Agriculture Security experts from continuing to strive for improvement.  
Continued research and cooperative efforts are needed to prevent compromising the safety, 
security, and ongoing operations of our food and agriculture systems that result from disconnects 
in the domains of communication, knowledge, and resourcing. 
  Krusemark’s study related to Food and Agriculture 
Security because efficient decision making impacts food protection for consumers.   Several 
disconnects that emerged through this thesis relate to decision making.  For example, disconnects 
caused by confusion regarding the timing of the declaration of a TAD outbreak may have a 
negative impact on trade and consumer perception.  
   
 
                                                 
148 Katie Krusemark is a scholar in the Frontier program who studied whether or not food safety and food defense 
educational programs incorporated methods that helped professionals make good decisions.  Katie Krusemark, 
"Katie Krusemark FIX Project,"  http://frontier.k-
state.edu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=160&Itemid=39. Accessed November 2010.  
“Naturalistic decision-making aims to determine how humans actually make decisions in real-world settings.”  
Kathryn S. Krusemark, "Decision-Making Applications in Food Safety and Food Defense" (Kansas State 
University, 2009). Pg. 17.  
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